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ABSTRACT
OPENING THE LANCANG (MEKONG) RIVER IN YUNNAN:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR XISHUANGBANNA
MAY 1998
MERRICK LEX BERMAN
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Donald E. Gjertson
Regional cooperation to develop the Lancang (Mekong) River in China and
five neighboring states of mainland Southeast Asia has swept the Chinese border
region of Xishuangbanna Prefecture into a period of rapid change. Once an isolated
region of lush tropical rain forest, Xishuangbanna will face increasing pressures of
land, water, and air traffic; industrialization; urbanization; and subsequently risks of
pollution, deforestation and environmental degradation. This study examines the
plans for future development, the existing infrastructure, and the use of the river by the
local residents, in order to identify the areas of greatest contact and possible conflict
that will result from the opening of this international shipping corridor.
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PREFACE
This study is divided into four sections, the first of which places the sudden
interest in developing the Lancang (Mekong) corridor in its current international
context. As the six countries of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) have begun to
cooperate on economic development, they have found increasing support from both
regional and international organizations. Although a variety of basic infrastructure
projects have already been agreed upon in the transport, energy, tourism, telecom-
munications, and human resource development sectors, one of the projects which has
already made considerable headway is the opening of the shipping corridor on the
Lancang (Mekong) River. During the last two years, new border agreements and
navigation agreements have opened the ilow of trade goods along the route from
Xishuangbanna in the north, to Chiang Khong, Thailand and Huay Xai. Laos in the
south.
In the second part of this study, the physical geography of the river basin, as
well as its existing transport and energy infrastructure will be looked at in greater
detail. The soaring cliffs, rapids, and surging currents which characterize the northern
reaches of the Lancang River in China preclude any navigation except at a few
protected ferry crossings, while the widening of the river and lessening of the degree
of slope makes the Xishuangbanna region the farthest north that navigation has
traditionally been able to penetrate.
The history and economy of Xishuangbanna are examined in the third part of
this study, focusing on the Dai kingdom which dominated the area for many centuries.
The Dai people of Xishuangbanna, with their highly developed social and political
structures, were the northern members of a network of four loosely associated Dai
kingdoms. With the formation of modern "states," borders divided the four kingdoms
vi
into the territories of China. Laos, Thailand and Myanmar, and then the Dai people
were further isolated by the Communist consolidation of the Yunnan frontier.
Although they have been forced to dissociate themselves from their cross-border
neighbors for many decades, the Dai people are now being held up as models for the
traditional "ethnic trade." which is supposed to form a cultural and linguistic basis for
the booming border trade now sweeping Yunnan.
The fourth section of this study will evaluate and compare the various points of
view being expressed by the Chinese authors writing on the subject of opening up
Yunnan's border regions to international trade and tourism. This section will focus on
the inconsistent objectives that have been set forth to open up the Lancang (Mekong)
corridor, (for example, the contradictions implicit in a policy of connecting ethnicity
and trade), and will contrast the sensibilities of Yunnan native authors with national
level development and policy experts, and provide a background for analysis of
emerging trends throughout the region. Such trends include the impact of world
market forces, urbanization, and tourism on the local society. In conclusion, the
effects of shipping traffic on the Lancang River ecology will be considered and
contrasted with the philosophy of preserving Yunnan's natural environment by
developing eco-tourism. As an appendix to the main text, the latter position on nature
conservation will be spelled out by a complete translation of Yang Fuquan's 1995
article. "Eco-Tourism and the Protection of Yunnan's Tourist Resources."
vn
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CHAPTER I
NEW WAVE OF INTEREST IN DEVELOPING THE LANCANG (MEKONG)
REGION
A. Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Cooperation
For more than half a century, many plans have been put forward to harness the
Mekong (also known as the Lancang), the vital river that rolls down from the moun-
tains of central China and links all five countries of mainland Southeast Asia. Due to
the political and social turmoil that has shaken the entire region for many decades, the
majority of these development programs were put on hold, while the development that
did take place often resulted in the deforestation and further degradation of the river
basin, rather than in improving it. 1
During the last several years, the Mekong has once again become a focus of
attention as the six riparian countries of the Mekong (Cambodia, China, Laos,
Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) have found a mutual advantage in opening up the
river basin for development, and are working to establish subregional economic
cooperation in a political environment that promises some degree of stability. The
basic change in the region has been the sudden growth of border trade, and the
promise of shorter, cheaper connections between China and its southwestern neighbors
If the Mekong can be opened up for transport of raw materials, agricultural products,
manufactured goods, and passengers, then a new engine to drive the regional economy
can be created and the recent boom of trade with the landlocked Chinese province,
Yunnan, can be sustained.
I
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(Based on Zhonghua renmin gongheguo qihou aiji, 1978: 6.)
Map 1. The Lancang (Mekong) River in China and Southeast Asia
2
L Growth of Border Trade Between China and the Mekong Countries
Toward the end of the 1980's, unofficial border trade increased significantly in
Yunnan. This revival and the subsequent boom of China's trade with Southeast Asia
followed decades of unsettled relations, during which the establishment and discon-
tinuation of trade relations proceeded like a wild roller coaster ride over a series of
political upheavals.
For example, a boom in trade with Myanmar began in 1987, with the begin-
ning of the Burma Socialist Program Party's liberalization of foreign and domestic
trade policies.2 Burma's trade with China rose by 72% over the previous year. In
1988, when the mlingjunta, the State Law and Order Restoration Committee, or
SLORC, officially opened the border to trade with China, trade jumped up another
65%.3 (See Fig. 1)
In the case of Laos, which had been receiving technical assistance from China
for the construction of the "Mao Zedong Road" in Phong Saly during the 60's and
70's,4 relations with China deteriorated in 1978, when Laos showed support for Viet
Nam. Full diplomatic relations between Vientiane and Beijing were not re-established
until May 1988. 5 Although the volume of trade between China and Laos does not
rank them as significant trading partners, nonetheless a strategic interest in developing
the surface routes in northern Laos, remains.6
As for border trade with Viet Nam, official trade at the Hekou / Laokai port
was suspended by the Sino-Viet War of 1 979, and was not officially reopened until
May, 1993. 7 Reflecting the gap in official relations, no trade figures for Viet Nam
were listed in China's Statistical Yearbook from 1980 to 1990. Trade had already
shifted into high gear by the time normalization of relations was announced in
November of 1991,8 and has been soaring ever since. (See Fig. 2) The craze in
border trade with Viet Nam has rapidly overwhelmed the existing infrastructure,
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causing huge bottlenecks at the official crossings. Although the rail crossing at Hekou
/ Laokai has was re-opened by 1994, and the rail gauge was widened to a one-meter
standard, it has not recaptured it's former significance as the lifeline between Hanoi
and Kunming. In 1 993, the majority of traffic was being run across the Nanxi River
by ferry boat and reloaded onto lorries at the other side (see Fig. 3)9 but by late 1997,
unofficial trade was no longer in evidence and had been replaced by regulated daily
crossings of trains, trucks, and pedestrians.
If we take into account China's trade relations with Thailand, (formally estab-
lished in 1975), then the urgent interest to open up a low cost shipping route between
the two countries becomes perfectly clear. Combined imports and exports for 1992
and 1993 exceeded US$ 1.4 billion. 10 m 1994, the trade volume skyrocketed above
the US$ 2 billion mark, an increase of50% over the previous year. (See Fig. 4) Since
the vast majority of this trade is conducted by shipping across thousands of miles of
sea lanes, and is further obstructed by backlogs in the domestic rail network in China,
both sides see advantages in the Lancang (Mekong) corridor, particularly for Chinese
exports of raw materials produced in Yunnan or the greater southwest. 1 1 In this sense
the Lancang (Mekong) is viewed as an engine to drive north-south trade and
investment.
During the 1 990's, yet another factor impacted several of the Greater Mekong
Subregion (GMS) countries. Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia were forced to seek out
new partners when the trading arrangements of their former top trading partners - the
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries — suddenly fell into disarray. 12 This
only served to increase the momentum of unifying the subregional economy, and was
a motivating force for the ratification of new border treaties. A Lao-Chinese treaty
signed in December 1993, formally established the border line (of 416km) surveyed
4
the previous year. As for the border between Myanmar and Laos, formed by the
Mekong River, and which runs south from China to Thailand, the demarcation of it's
263 km length was not officially established until October 1995.13
.
The resolution of these border disputes has created a tremendous potential for
the formation of a greater "economic quadrangle," sometimes called the "golden
quadrangle," which would link some 50 million people in a vast region of 600,000
square kilometers. 14 This "golden quadrangle," juxtaposed with some irony on top of
the "golden triangle," is just another name that has been invented to portray the eco-
nomic forces already at work in the subregion. The momentum for cooperation that is
building up among the GMS governments is also drawing considerable interest in
private business circles, such as the launching of a mutual investment fund in
Singapore, 15 and the founding of the Economic Quadrangle Joint Development
Company.! 6
As one researcher, Mark Nguyen, puts it:
"For the first time this century, the nations of Southeast Asia..., as well as
China's southern province of Yunnan, are not only on relatively good terms
with each other, but are willing to co-operate with the international community
to further advance their market-oriented policies of growth and
development." 17
2. Emerging Players in GMS Development
As the Mekong region faces the possibility of major new infrastructure projects
being launched, many forces are drawn into the picture. Within China there are
national level policies and security issues involved, and yet, interestingly, it has been
Yunnan Province, not Beijing that has been participating in the subregional develop-
ment conferences.
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In this respect, it is not surprising that the governor of Yunnan Province, He
Zhiqiang, outlined a plan to develop the "Lancang Economic Belt" in May, 1993. The
plan called for developing mining operations in the mountainous upper section of the
river basin; to concentrate on building hydropower stations and wood processing
facilities in the middle section; and to open up the lower section passing through
Xishuangbanna (XSBN) to international shipping. 1 8 The announcement coincided
with an expedition undertaken by a China, Laos, Myanmar, Thai joint observation
group, which had been surveying the Lancang (Mekong) from February to May of the
same year. And though Yunnan's governor seemed to be taking the lead in proposing
the Lancang Economic Belt, his comments were echoed by the Chinese Premier, Li
Peng, who had been in attendance at the Yunnan provincial government meetings
where the policy was drafted. 1 9
On the local level, there is little evidence of officials in XSBN taking part in
the planning of the new regional agenda.20 As for the people living in the areas where
there is likely to be the greatest social and environmental impact, there isn't even a
shred of information available. In stark contrast, international support for developing
the Mekong is gathering steam, busily concocting huge road networks and energy
grids all over the map.
Beginning in 1 992, a series of conferences and deliberations have been held
among the six GMS countries with the aim of coordinating their infrastructure invest-
ments. By the time of the 4th conference (September 1994),21 the momentum had
built up to the point of implementing priority projects, and the beginnings of an insti-
tutional base to sustain the process of subregional cooperation was already being
formed.
With institutional support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the Tourism Authority of Thailand
(TAT), and the Mekong River Committee (MRC), a new wave of interest in
developing the GMS is gathering strength.
In May 1996, the ADB extended a technical assistance grant of US$800,000 to
provide training in areas of concern (from a regional perspective) on environmental
problems.22 At the August 1996 conference, held in Kunming, (provincial capital of
Yunnan,) the ADB vice president, Bong-Suh Lee, announced the extension of
US$300 million in loans, the most substantial economic backing for the GMS projects
so far, and which was referred to as merely "seed money," to attract much larger
investments.23
Educational support has appeared in the form of the "Institute of Economic
Development and Cooperation", established in a memorandum of understanding
between the governments of Thailand and New Zealand in August 1996. The Institute
is now located at Khon Kaen University and trains managers from the public and
private sectors of the participating GMS countries.24 Although not directly involved
with the GMS development projects, considerable contributions to the study of the
upper Mekong have been made by the Thai-Yunnan Project of Australian National
University and the Upper Mekong Research Project, funded by the Australian
Research Council.25
In addition to the support of these agencies, a recent meeting between the
newly revived MRC26 and representatives of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) in Kuala Lumpur suggests that more support from neighboring
countries, such as Malaysia, might:
"...propel a bigger wave of emerging ASEAN multinational companies into
the region,"27
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which would have far-reaching consequences for the region in terms of capital for
investment and industrial growth.
As grants, loans, and private funds gravitate toward the GMS projects,
inevitable-choices will be made as to which sectors will be developed first. The main
sectors, for which detailed projects were discussed and recommended at the 3rd
conference on subregional development (April 1994), were transport, energy,
environment, trade & investment, and tourism. To these should probably be added
telecommunications, which became a high priority at the GMS meeting held in Phnom
Penh (July 1996) 28 Since many of the infrastructure projects will require huge
capital investments, and long periods of time for completion, the earliest signs of
progress have been seen in the Water Transport Subsector's "Upstream Lancang
(Mekong) River Navigation Improvement Project", a project which not only requires a
comparatively low initial investment, but which was already partially underway as
early as 1990.29
B. Opening the Lancang (Mekong) River
On the short list of priority GMS projects, the opening of the Lancang
(Mekong) River, which will connect China's Yunnan Province to Thailand via Laos
and Myanmar, is at the very top. In China, the navigable section of the Lancang
passes through Xishuangbanna Autonomous Prefecture (XSBN), the highly variegated
terrain of intermontane basins near the southwestern border of Yunnan Province. The
Mekong basin area to the south of China, comprising part of the infamous Golden
Triangle (Myanmar, Thailand, Laos), has been isolated not only by ongoing insur-
rections but also by miserable roads, total lack of communications, and deliberate
political and military containment.30 In the optimistic terminology of the GMS
8
projects, it has been re-christened the Golden Quadrangle, connecting China, Laos,
Myanmar, and Thailand. Nonetheless, without great capital investments in infra-
structure, the Golden Quadrangle will be unable to link up a network of surface roads
in the near future.3
1
River traffic, on the other hand, has been the basic means of transport in this
area for ages.32 Though impeded by rapids and falls, which made the Mekong
impassable to larger ships, there is no question that local residents, familiar with the
dangerous spots, could navigate on small craft in the intervening sections, stopped
only by the tremendous force of the current.33 More importantly, despite the
difficulties of navigation, and the negligible volume of commercial traffic:
"...a most important function of the barge and pirogue traffic is to connect the
many small villages along the Mekong which are not accessible either by road
or airplane."34
Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that the river remains a lifeline for the resi-
dents of the basin when considering the means and objectives of enlarging the traffic
into a major corridor for international shipping and transport.
Building on the volume of small-scale traffic, which has arguably been in exis-
tence for ages, China and Laos began joint surveys and tests of the route between
Jinghong and Huay Xai in 1990. Shortly after the 1 st GMS conference in Oct 1992, a
survey team was formed of geographers, hydrologists, and technicians from China,
Laos, Thailand and Myanmar, who conducted a series ofjoint surveys and tests along
the international shipping route during the spring of 1993. Meanwhile, the political
representatives of the four governments, have succeeded in creating a legal framework
for river transport, and established an administrative committee to address navi-
gational issues on the Lancang (Mekong) in January 1994.35 In October 1994, a "free
navigation" agreement was agreed upon by senior officials of the four nations, which
officially opened up four ports in China, two ports in Myanmar, five ports in Laos, and
two ports in Thailand to navigation by one another's ships 36 An "experimental"
9
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shipment of apples from Jinghong to Chiang Saen Thailand took place in 1995, the
same year which showed a dramatic rise in reported shipments along the route, from
500 tons in 1991, to 40,000 tons in 1995.37
The cost-effective link between China and three adjacent countries has led to
greatly increased traffic on the Mekong, and proposed improvements, which include
blasting rapids and shoals with dynamite, seek to increase the year-round capacity of
the route to accommodate 100-300 ton vessels.
But just as the opening of the Lancang gains momentum, and a host of other
infrastructure projects in the GMS are beginning to be implemented,38 there
corresponding need to evaluate the ecological and social impact that they will have
both the river and the residents of the region. Some work of this type already exists
for the downstream parts of the Mekong,39 but very little has been done on the
upstream part of the river, which spills from glacier-covered mountains of Tibet and
reaches tropical rain forests along the international border.
As the Lancang (Mekong) route is upgraded and linked to ports and road
networks downstream, economic, ecological, and social impacts will effect areas along
the river basin. This study will focus on one section of the Lancang River: the 180
km section that flows through XSBN Autonomous Prefecture, in Yunnan Province,
China. The existing environmental, economic, and social conditions in the Lancang
basin ofXSBN will be examined in order to assess the potential impacts of opening
the region to international traffic.
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Map 2. The Lancang River in Yunnan
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C. Endnotes to Chapter 1
1. The causes of deforestation are many, and though it is hard to say whether
development, the destruction caused by war, or clearing of land for housing and
agriculture are-the worst contributors, nonetheless, the loss of forest land in the
Mekong region has been disastrous. Cambodia has lost more than 50% of its forest
cover since the 1960's; Vietnam's forest cover has dropped from 44% to 24% during
the last five decades; the northeastern part of Thailand, Isan. saw a drop of forest
cover from 65% in 1951 to merely 8% in 1985. ...estimates for the entire Mekong basin
show a decline from about 50% in 1970 to only 27% in 1985, with consequent
problems of erosion and flooding. See: Jacobs, 1995: 137. Another example of
degradation is found in the Pak Mool Dam. which was completed in 1991 and has
resulted in the bankruptcy of several thousand fisherman. See a related article in Thai
Development Newsletter, no. 26 (1994): 11-13.
2. FEA. 1995: 627.
3. A summary of Sino-Burmese trade is found in Chen, 1 995. In the preceding
decades, trade relations had been destabilized by the activities of a Chinese-funded
Burmese Communist Party (BCP), not to mention a series of armed insurgencies and
the constant presence of sophisticated opium producers and their private armies. The
turmoil of the 1967 protests in Yangoon and the founding of the BCP are detailed in
Pettman. 1973: 32-39. The insurgencies in Myanmar are recounted in Lintner, 1990.
For a full account of the drug trade in Southeast Asia, see McCoy. 1991 : 162-192,
283-386.
4. Yang, 1993: 8.
5. FEA, 1995: 513-514.
6. Safe travel through northern Laos remains an elusive goal, and the prospect of the
quiet historic capital. Luang Prabang. becoming a truck stop between the greater
economic powers in Kunming and Thailand is viewed by some observers with great
ambivalence. See Lintner. 1996.
7. FBIS CHI-93-094 (May 18. 1993): 14.
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8. FEA, 1995: 1013.
9. See Zhang, 1993.
10. FEA, 1995: 992.
11. A new rail line between Kunming and Nanning. (opened Jan 1998,) will improve
access to the South China Sea, and will significantly increase shipping access between
Yunnan and ports in Thailand and South Asia. As for construction of more direct
surface connections, improvement of the Jinghong-Tachilek-Mae Sai road is underway,
but presently cannot match the carrying capacity for bulk cargo of the Mekong.
According to Liu Daqing, of Yunnan's Transport Bureau, Navigation Section, the
bottlenecks in the rail networks linking Yunnan to various seaports are so severe that
Yunnan is faced with as much as a 50% gap in export capacity. He estimates: "By the
year 2000, the two (landlocked) provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou. just in terms of
phosphorous and coal, will have an export shortfall of at least 8.7 million tons, a very
serious situation. ..and since the roads are not good enough for long-distance hauling, it
makes the development of the Lancang shipping route -- 'facing South Asia, join the
competition' M [r] SliS ' 0j]UW.^-- rise before our eyes as vitally important."
Author's translation of Liu, 1991: 508.
12. Tan, etal. 1995: 226.
13. Nguyen, 1996: 200-201.
14. Parts of Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, and Yunnan comprise the "golden square"
;
Z3l%. A Description of the "golden quadrangle" is found in Tang, et al, 1995: 32.
15. The Crosby Fund, offered by Crosby Asset Management. See (Singapore)
Business Times. (May 17, 1996) (via Lexis Nexis).
16. Nguyen. 1996: 204
17. Nguyen, 1996: 199
18. FBIS CHI-93-063 (Apr 5.1993).
19. FBIS CHI-93-092 (May 14. 1993), and FBIS CHI-93-096 (May 20, 1993). This is
confirmed by the May 28th, Central News Agency article: "Premier Li Peng, from the
highest strategic level, approved all of Yunnan's proposals to establish the Lancang
basin as a vital national district for development and opening up." In Qiao bao (May
29, 1993): 4. The article describes Li Peng, Premier of China's State Council, as
participating in the Yunnan Provincial government's formulation of a policy to
establish the Lancang as a "foreign directed economic belt."
20. The Prefectural governor of XSBN. Zhao Cunxin. wrote an article on developing
the Lancang [Zhao. 1991]. His long-term plan called for creating a tropical resources
base in XSBN. as well as developing tourism, hydropower, and river transport. His
views largely reflected the official government policy and were, if anything, very
conservative. On the other end of the spectrum, the vice-mayor of Jinghong, Dao
Yumin, is promoting more direct surface connections from Yunnan, through the
Burmese Shan states to Thailand. Citing the surrender of the drug-baron, Khun Sa, in
January of 1 996. Dao suggested that a route south from Jinghong through
Damenglong and the Myanmar towns of Mong Yawng, Mong Hpayak. and Tachilek
to Mae Sai is now feasible. Dao said that a new border crossing would be opened on
the route in January 1997. See: "China Pushes New Route to Thailand," in Straights
Times, (November 11. 1996): 25 (via LexisNexis).
21. Held in Chiang Mai, 15-16 September, 1994. See: Asian Development Bank,
1994b.
22. Reported in Bangkok Post (May 24,1996) (via LexisNexis).
23. At the Aug 1996 GMS conference, held in Kunming, the ADB vice president,
Bong-Suh Lee said that ADB had prepared US$300 million in loans to invest in the
region during the next three years, calling the GMS the "last frontier of economic
development. ...We can expect such investment to grow rapidly and reach a target of at
least $1 .3 billion by the turn of the century." Gunther Hecker of the ADB's transport
and communications section said, "The $300 million is the trigger element for others
to follow. We lay the seeds." Reported by Reuters (August 30. 1996) (via Clarinet).
24. New Zealand has pledged NZ$10 million (US$7 mil), and Thailand has pledged
another 5 million baht (US$250,000) of funding for the institute. Reported by Agence
France Presse. (August 281996) (via LexisNexis). In February, 1997, the Institute
was officially opened in Khon Kaen, Thailand.
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25. The only journal devoted to studies of the society, economy, and linguistics of the
Dai and Thai people living in the upper Mekong region is the Thai Yunnan Project
Newsletter (TYPN), founded in 1987. Edited by Gehan Wijeyewardene, the TYPN is
published by the Department of Anthropology, Research School of Pacific and Asian
Studies, Australian National University, and is available on the internet at
ftp.coombs.anu.edu. The Upper Mekong Research Project was established in 1991,
when co-directors E.C. Chapman (Director, National Thai Studies Centre, Australia
National University) and Peter Hinton (Anthropology Department. University of
Sydney) were awarded a grant from the Australian Research Council See- TYPN 17
(June. 1992): 30.
26. The history of the MRC is recounted in Jacobs. 1995.
27. Reported by Straights Times (Singapore). (September 8. 1996) (via LexisNexis).
28. Reported by Reuters (August 5. 1996) (via LexisNexis).
29. According to the Yunnan Yearbook 1992, "Building on the foundations of a 1990
China/Laos joint survey of the river during dry season, and shipping trials with cargo-
laden vessels that tested the Lancang -Mekong shipping route, on August 2nd, 1991.
three ships loaded with 155 tons of garlic, cement, and other goods cast off from
Jinghong, sailed for 402km. and arrived at Huay Xai. Huoa Kong. Laos on Aug 6th.
There they took on a load of 30 tons of ground coffee and returned to Jinghong."
Author's translation from Yunnan nianjian, 1992: p253.
30. For a description of the physical conditions of the Shan states in Myanmar. see
Bertil Lintner's account of his travels: Lintner, 1990.
31. Road projects are listed in Asian Development Bank. 1994a.
32. The Chinese sources consulted for this study, with one exception (Yao. 1948).
unanimously state that river traffic on the Lancang did not exist before the
establishment of steam-powered ferries in the 1950's. On the other hand. Western
visitors to Jinghong consistently report the use of 50-foot long pirogues. See, for
example. Colquhuon, 1885: 98.
33. At Nan'akou, on the Chinese border, the annual average flow rate has been
measured at 2020 cubic meters per second [data from Liu, 1991: 513]. Since hand-
poled pirogues were the usual river craft of the villages along the Mekong in upper
Laos. [Halpern. 1961 : 32]. there must have been limits beyond which the craft could
not be pushed, though there remained the option of towing or portage. According to
one 19th century observer, "...poling.. .dug-outs against the stream of the Me Kawng...
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between the worst rapids a good three miles an hour is kept up.. .in many places the
boats are unloaded and hauled over by ropes, an occupation in which a "day or two is
often expended." [Smyth. 1898: (v.l) 161]. According to the same author, from
Jinghong to Luang Prabang "the actual journey need only occupy five days; the
journey up, from twelve to fifteen..." [Smyth. 1898: (v.l) 164]. See an account of a
1940's journey on the Lancang, translated below in Chapter IV, "Use of the Lancang
River in Dai Societv."
34. Halpern, 1961: 33. j • -• tngfaai, v,t* ,- •
35. Asian Development Bank, 1994: 147.
36. The ports opened were:
China: Jinghong, Simao. Menghan. Nan'ahe.
Myanmar: Wan Seng [100°35'E by 20°50'N], Wan Pong.
Laos: Ban Say. Xieng Kok, Moaung Mom. Huay Xai, Luang Prabang.
Thailand: Chiang Saen, and Chiang Khong.
Reported by Nusara Thaitawat, Bangkok Post, 13 Oct 94 (via LexisNexis).
37. See: Business Vietnam, (September 1996) (via LexisNexis).
38. See the full list of Transport Sector Projects in Asian Development Bank, 1994a:
89.
39. The Nam Pong post-audit study, conducted in the mid-70s, is perhaps the most
comprehensive examination undertaken on the economic, social, & environmental
impacts of a multipurpose reservoir in the Mekong region. It was built at Nam Pong.
Thailand [102°50' E by 16°45' N] and opened in 1966. See: Jacobs. 1995: 144-45.
Other basic research on the basin related to Mekong development can be found in
Fujioka. 1966.
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CHAPTER II
THE LANCANG RIVER: GEOGRAPHY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
m
A
-
Geography of the Lancang Basin
The Lancang River originates in eastern Tibet or Qinghai, where its highest
tributaries wind down the valleys of the Tang'gula Mountains. 1 In the Xikang region
of eastern Tibet, the upper reaches are known as Zachu or Za'emuchu Near the border
town of Xika, (29°N by 98 25E), the Lancang enters Yunnan and plunges through
deep gorges, hemmed in on both sides by mountains.
The same tectonic collision between the South Asian and Eurasian continental
plates that forms the Himalaya, causes an abrupt fold in the topography in the north-
western part of Yunnan, and forms a series of north / south ranges there known as the
Hengduan Mountains. The highest mountain in Yunnan, Kawagarbo, is found here.
Towering 6,740 meters over the west bank of the Lancang River, Kawagarbo's east
face is covered with a giant glacier.2 (See Fig. 5) On the east bank of the river, across
from Kawagarbo, is Deqen, the highest elevation county seat in Yunnan, at some
3,480 meters. 3 In this formidable terrain, where the water rushes down narrow chasms
strewn with boulders, hundreds of meters below the nearest footpath, it is easy to
understand why river transport was not developed.4 (See Fig. 6)
The Lancang flows south from Kawagarbo, through the Dulong Gorge5 and
continues nearly due south for hundreds of kilometers, hemmed in by mountain ranges
with peaks of 3,000 to 4,000 meters. At Yongping, the north / south mountain ranges
break up into smaller, differentiated ranges with peaks of 2,000 to 2,500 meters, and
the river makes a bend southeastward. (See Fig. 7)
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Along its southeastward course below Yongping, the mountains on the east
bank are higher than those on the west bank. Reaching the Wuliang Mountains, the
Lancang turns due south again, and begins a winding course that forms the border
between Lincang and Simao Prefectures. Below the port town of Xiaoganlanba, the
river enters XSBN Prefecture, flanked on the west by high plains at 1,050 to 1,200
meters elevation, and with mountain peaks in the range of 1 ,600 to 2,200 meters. To
the east of the river are a convoluted series of very fragmented mountains ranging in
height from 1,200 to 1,500 meters, among which are many bazifi or basins at an
average elevation of 550-610 meters.
The valley of the Lancang basin, stretching from Xiaoganlanba south to
Nan'ahekou at the Myanmar border, has ranges of 1,100 to 1,400 meters on both banks,
and gorges of 300 to 500 meters. The climate of this region is primarily subject to the
Indian monsoon, and its mountains were once covered with lush rain forest. In ad-
dition to cultivated tropical crops such as fruits, rubber, aromatics, and tea, XSBN's
native flora has been preserved in networks of deep, zigzagging valleys. XSBN's
treasure house of botanical diversity, though much depleted in recent decades, still
offers a tremendous resource for botanical research and eco-tourism if carefully
preserved.7 (See Fig. 8)
South of the Chinese border, the Lancang River is known as the Mekong, or
"mother of waters," and flows through Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and
Vietnam, before finally merging into the South China Sea at the Mekong River Delta
south of Ho Chi Minn City. A comparison of the Mekong and Lancang sections of the
river reveals that roughly half of the river's length lies in each, but that the drainage
area in mainland Southeast Asia is approximately four times as large as the estimated
drainage area in China. Of the drainage area inside China, Yunnan's accounts for
more than 50%. (See Fig. 9)
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- Transport on the Lancang River
Knowledge of transport on the Lancang River in the northern half of Yunnan is
aided by early Chinese accounts,* by the records of the Dali Nanzhao Kingdom* and
by numerous accounts of both colonial period and modern explorers, most notably
Joseph Rock, F. Kingdon Ward, and deCarne.10 There are accounts of notable cros-
sings of the Yangzi, Lancang, and Nujiang, either by bamboo rafts or inflated skin-
floats, usually as part of a military campaign and undertaken with great loss of life.
Eyewitness accounts of upstream crossings are found in the works of Joseph Rock,
who lived in northern Yunnan for nearly twenty years and left detailed maps and
photographs of his numerous expeditions. 1
1
(See Fig. 10)
The available evidence suggests that fords and crossings of the rivers existed at
various favorable points, that crossings were in many cases seasonal and dependent on
conditions of weather and current, and that they were both arduous and extremely
dangerous. 12 This is further supported by the numerous bridges found all along the
steep valleys and gorges of northern and western Yunnan, of the sort which pro-
liferated throughout Burma, Tibet, and the greater Himalayan region. (See Fig. 1 1)
1. Bridges
Bridges are widely used throughout the upper Lancang region. The
simplest type of bridge technology employed to cross the wild rivers were rope slide
bridges, along which entire caravans
—
piece by piece, horse after horse—were slung
from one side of the rocky chasm to the other. (See Fig. 12) The average bridge:
"...is 150 feet above the river bed and one glides down at express speed
to less than 50 feet on the other side. Those unaccustomed to crossing by
such...means, strapped to an oak-wood slider greased with yak butter, are all
but cheerful at the prospect... those used to crossing such ropes suspended high
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above the river, pass back and forth as unconcerned as we would cross a
courtyard. The rope is often greased by the man sliding across, he would put
liquid butter from a bamboo tube into his mouth and, holding his head above
the rope, would let the butter run out of his mouth onto the rope (See Fig 13)Only mules, horses and heavy weights reach the other bank without aid
Lightweights remain suspended on the sagging rope in the middle over the
roaring torrent. This necessitates pulling oneself up hand over hand to the
other side....The horses are not less frightened than their riders, for they kick
the air with tails up and open mouths, and lie down exhausted from fear on the
other side."!3 (See Fig. 14)
In addition to rope bridges, iron chain bridges were built on the key caravan
routes. 14 These are found primarily in the Nanzhao sphere of influence around the
modern town of Dali. Some ruins of iron bridges are found southwest of Dali, span-
ning the Yangbi River on the road to Yongping, and across the Lancang between
Yongping and Baoshan. (See Fig. 15) The ruins of a strategic iron bridge northwest
of Lijiang, on the caravan route to Tibet are found on the Yangzi river near Qicong.15
2. Ferries
Although Chinese scholars writing on the subject of developing the river do
not mention transport on the Lancang before modern times, rope bridges are not used
south of the Wuliang Shan area, where the width of the river, and the variable height
of the banks make them impractical. Without bridges, how did anyone get across?
Based on a map from 1945, a decade before mechanized shipping appeared on
the lower Lancang, there were nine ferry crossings marked in the Chinese section of
the river below 24°N, while none were marked for the section above 24°N. 16 Since
the number of ferry crossings increases dramatically along the lower Lancang, we
must assume that some form of navigation did exist there. The gap in Chinese records
and observations can be explained by the fact that the Chinese did not actually occupy
the XSBN region until the 1950's.^
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Since the introduction of mechanized ferries in 1955, stations at Yunjinghong,
Ganlanba, Menglun, Guanlei, and Simao have gone into operation. Several ports have
been expanded and rebuilt, including the new Xiaoganlanba Port, which can handle
80,000 tons and 150,000 passengers annually. 18
In the village of Guanlei, workers ride the ferry upriver to seek employment,
then float back down river on tire inner-tubes, and the townspeople hurry on board to
purchase daily necessities whenever the boat arrives. 19 (See Fig. 16) The example of
Guanlei, suggests that the vital commercial connection provided by shipping services
is the only means of communication for some of the mountain regions. Inaccessible
by road, especially during the long rainy season, these conditions duplicate those
found on the nearby sections of the Mekong in Laos and Myanmar, where people in
the riverine communities travel on the river in pirogues (with or without outboard
motors), river barges, and rafts.20
3. Existing River Transport
Beginning in 1955, when the first ferry capable of carrying automobiles went
into operation at Yunjinghong, the use of mechanized shipping on the river developed
very slowly. The first steamship was introduced in 1962, and the use of the river for
shipping began to be organized in 1965.21 During the 1970s, further development of
the 188km section from the Myanmar border to Ganlanba allowed ships of 50-140
tons to dock. During high water seasons, the docks could handle ships of 300-500
tons. By the late 1980s, ships of 300 tons could land year-round.22
In 1988, there were 28 freighters in operation. Their net capacity was 281 tons,
and 785 passengers. There were also 10 barges with a net capacity of 740 tons. The
vessels were organized under a state-run shipping company with two teams, which
were also responsible for maintaining the anchorages and repair shops 23 The number
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(Adapted from People's Republic of Chim Atlas. Washington: CIA, 1971: 22)
Map 3. River Transport in Xishuangbanna
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of boats in use on the Lancang remains rather small, but it is important to keep in mind
the extent to which shipping is being developed on the Mekong, immediately to the
south, and also to the huge inland shipping system of Myanmar, immediately to the
west.
In Myanmar, freight volume on inland waterways has risen steadily in recent
years. Moreover, container traffic handled in Myanmar doubled between 1991-92 and
1992-93, and was expected to have doubled again by 1994-95.24 (See Fig. 17) Sig-
nificantly, even as Myanmar continues to play an important role in providing access to
the Indian Ocean for Chinese goods, Yunnan province has received delivery of three
800-ton barges built by Myanmar Shipyards, the first of a nine-barge order. Yunnan
has meanwhile ordered nineteen other vessels.25 What will Yunnan do with 800-ton
barges? If they do not intend to use them in Myanmar, then the only feasible options
are to operate them on the Lancang River or the Yuan River. Will Yunnan attempt to
emulate the booming Myanmar inland shipping business and move to containerization?
If so, XSBN has the prospect of not just several thousand tons of cargo passing
through their pristine forests every year, but up to a million tons!
C. Industrial and Energy Infrastructure
1 . Energy Sector
The ambitious plan to develop hydroelectric stations on the Lancang has been
strongly supported by the Provincial and Central governments, and has also received
funding from foreign aid programs and lending agencies. He Zhiqiang's 1993 strategy
to develop the Lancang River "Economic Belt" called for completing the Manwan and
Dachaoshan power stations, and the Xiaowan reservoir.26 These are part of an ambi-
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tious overall plan to build a series often hydropower stations along the Lancang River,
at positions ranging 30 km to 800 km north of the Myanmar border. (See Fig. 1 8)
Construction of the Manwan Dam, begun in 1986, was completed in 1995.
With an effective storage capacity of 150 million cubic meters, and an installed
generating capacity of 1
.5 million kilowatts, the Manwan serves as a model for other,
larger hydrostations that will someday span the upper reaches of the Lancang. (See Fig.
19)
Construction of the Dachaoshan dam, with a planned generating capacity of
1.25 million kilowatts, began in 1993 and is still underway. The giant Xiaowan
reservoir, is planned to have a 284 meter high concrete arch dam, which would be the
world's highest, and a storage capacity of 15 billion cubic meters. Construction of the
Xiaowan dam is scheduled to begin in 1996, with funding from the Japanese Overseas
Economic Cooperation Fund. In addition, the Nuozhadu dam, planned to store 23
billion cubic meters of water that will supply the downstream power stations at
Jinghong, Ganlanba, and Nan'ahekou, was in preparation in 1993.27
The construction often major dams on the upper Lancang will have major
impacts on the river's ecology, on flowrates, flooding, and silting, and will also com-
plicate the process of developing shipping routes. During the planning process,
objections to the lack of basin-wide plans to integrate power stations and navigation
were raised by Liu Daqing, of Yunnan's Transport Bureau, Navigation Section:
"...not only do surface roads need to be built up with investment capital,
and connections made through to construction bases, quarries, and outlying
areas; but in planning to open up a waterway there must first be a reasonable
investment to establish shipping routes, and connecting water-routes should be
made into a framework. Existing roads and construction bases on both banks
of the river should be linked together in order to expedite the construction of
each stage, as well as to create advantageous conditions to develop the
resources along the shores. We cannot simply imagine building hydropower
plants and opening up mines, and then set about building up transport as an
accessory..."28
24
? TIEMENKAN
TGONGGUO BRIDGE
Five Major Hydropower Projects:
(1) Xiaowan Dam
(2) Manwan Dam
(3) Dachaoshan Dam
(4) Nuozhadu Dam
(5) Jinghong Dam
Five Secondary Hydropower Projects: o
(6) Tiemenkan
(7) Gongguo Bridge
(8) Sijiacun
(9) Nan'aHekou
(10) Ganlanba
(1) /j\
(2) Wt
(3) ±m\h
(4) mim
(5) mm
(6) mn&
(7) ztj^m
(8) E^fa
(9) itraw
do mtm
(Based on Yunnan sheng jiaorong tu ;
Liu, 1991: 513; and Peng, 1995: 54-55.)
YUNNAN
XIAOWAN
AAANWAN
(INSTALLED)
SIJIACUN
/DACHAO SHAN
(UNDERWAY)
NAN'A HEKOU
LEX-
Map 4. Hydropower Development on the Lancang River
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The prospect of such giant reservoirs on the Lancang River in Yunnan casts a
long shadow over development projects being considered down river, on the Mekong.
Laos, with tremendous potential hydropower capacity, hopes to build up its own series
of power stations along rivers that drain into the Mekong, and to sell the excess
electricity to energy-hungry Thailand; however, in doing so, the Laotian dams would
further impact the volume of runoff into the Mekong basin.29
As a consequence of its own energy needs, Thailand has a keen interest in
maintaining a basin-wide development scheme that will protect both the flow to
hydropower plants and water reserves for its parched northern and northeastern
provinces. In Cambodia, the unique lake, Tongle Sap, which is fed by the back flow
of the Mekong during flood season, has been shrinking (due to silting and
deforestation), and raising concern about decreases in the water level of the Mekong.30
Vietnam, last in line on the Mekong basin, has currently set high stakes on
raising productivity levels in the Mekong delta, all of which would be threatened by
any reduction of available water. The fact that so many hopes for major development
schemes are placed on the availability of water from the Lancang (Mekong) is both a
cause for anxiety and a motivation to cooperate among the six GMS countries. Only
China, controlling 50% of the river's headwaters, remains in a position to develop the
river unilaterally, but progress of the GMS economic cooperation talks, and the many
agreements which have resulted, promise a much higher degree of mutual interest than
has ever existed in the region before. Meanwhile, a major scientific research project
has been launched in China, which will:
"...study and furnish solutions on: the distribution of water resources
along the Lancang / Mekong River, location of power stations at different
sections of the river, navigation and influences of river development exerted on
the lower reaches."31
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This research might help to ameliorate conecrns that development is proceeding
disorganized way and at an unchecked pace, but since the study is scheduled to
Continue until 1999, it will years before we see the project's findings and recom-
mendations. In the meantime, we can expect to see continual increases in shipping
and large-scale construction projects on the Lancang for the foreseeable future.
2. Industry
Industrial growth has, until recently, been concentrated in several urban areas
m Yunnan. Kunming, the provincial capital, has seen the greatest industrial growth,
while other industrial centers have emerged in Dongchuan, Xiaguan, (icjiu, and Yuxi.
XSBN has not experienced such a rapid rate of industrialization. The majority of
XSBN's population relies on subsistence agriculture and other traditional means of
livelihood. Although this study will not address the issue of traditional subsistence
agriculture in the Lancang River basin, it is important to keep in mind that the many
new roads and shipping routes being built here, combined with increased mobility for
the local people, is likely to create profound changes in the basic means of production
ami livelihood throughout XSBN.
The isolation and lack of basic infrastructure in XSBN has hampered industrial
growth so far, but in the wake of establishing rubber and tea plantations, some proces-
sing and refining facilities have been set up. There are rubber processing plants and
tea-processing plants that were set up in the 1970s and 1980s. 32
The completion of the Kun-Luo Highway (from Kunming to Daluo), the
Jinghong Bridge, and the Xiaoganlanba Port in Simao (See Fig. 20) is bound to
increase both existing industrial production and encourage the growth of new industry.
The question remains as to what type of industries will develop, whether they arc-
purely based on resource extraction, are focused toward domestic or international
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markets, and to what degree local cultures and social norms influence the types of
goods being produced.
According to aiong-range development plan outlined by Zhao Cunxin,
XSBN's governor, and Wu Jinhua ofXSBN's Industrial Bank, the new base of
transport infrastructure should be utilized to develop the region as a tropical agri-
culture base, and tourism area. They propose building up a food processing industry
and a "tropical ecological agriculture zone."33 Their plan conspicuously lacks mention
of large factories and industrial processing centers, and the fact that they emphasize
the need to maintain the ecological balance between the existing environment and
tropical agriculture is encouraging.
A radically different approach is taken by Peng Yongan, in his analysis of the
productive forces in the border regions of Yunnan. He sees the backward economies
in adjacent border areas as great targets for Chinese exports (an idea that succeeded in
Myanmar.) Therefore, writes Peng:
"Yunnan's border ports are an important route for China's strategy to reach the
Indian Ocean and to develop our foreign-directed economy. The huge markets
beyond Yunnan's borders are a genuine motive force for opening its border
region ports to foreign-directed trade."34
Peng goes on to outline ways to exploit various comparative advantages between the
bordering economies, including exploitation of raw materials, cheap labor, infrastruc-
ture and distribution networks.
Peng also advocates the repositioning of certain industries from the
hub at Kunming to the border region:
"Kunming has a number of lagging industries which should be retooled to
produce new goods. As for export goods suffering from high transport costs,
consideration should be given to vertical, as well as forward and backward
linkages...some parts of production could be shifted to the border region, and
the savings in transport costs would make the basic production costs more
competitive in the international market."35
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Although Peng analyzes in great detail the existing infrastructure, transport hubs, and
resource bases along Yunnan's border, and evaluates them for potential placement of
various industries, he does not explore any of the consequences that new industry
would have on the region. By focusing on resources and means of transport, Peng's
analysis is one of the most pragmatic available for those interested in industrial
expansion, therefore his proposals for "Yunnan forward-position border processing
bases" merits further consideration.
In terms of valley area and population, XSBN's capital, Yunjinghong, is much
smaller than the Kai-Ge-Meng economic base. (See Fig. 20) Kai-Ge-Meng, (an abbre-
viation of the cities Kaiyuan, Gejiu, and Mengzi), is a large mining and industrial base,
located on the railway between Kunming and the Viet Nam border. The area has a
long history of development, and was famous for the miserable conditions of its tin
mines before the Second World War.36 The production capacity of Kai-Ge-Meng, and
the railway (even though it dates back to 1910), are no doubt partly responsible for the
surge in trade with Viet Nam since 1991
.
Yunjinghong, on the other hand, is still a relatively small border city with a
population of some 50,000. The major industry has been the expansion of state rubber
and tea plantations, and during the 1980's, the allocation of small-holdings for rubber
growing, all of which are intimately dependent upon the tropical climate.37 The
Prefectural Governor ofXSBN, Zhao Cunxin, cites plantations of rubber, tea, sugar-
cane, tropical fruit and aromatics as the foundation ofXSBN's industry, and he
focused on the development of tropical crops, the travel industry, and food processing
in his own twenty-year development plan.38 For Zhao Cunxin, who is of Dai descent,
maintaining the ecological balance in XSBN is essential for the long-term develop-
ment of the tropical agriculture industry, currently it's main economic base.
29
(Based on Yunnan sheng kou'an fenbutu, 1993; and Yunnan sheng jiaotongtu, 1992)
Map 5. Surface Transport and Airports in XSBN Region
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The relocation oflagging' industries from Kunming to XSBN, as suggested by
Peng, would have a devastating impact on the environment, and is likely to meet with
opposition, if not open conflict.39 indeed the placement of industry closer to the
border, owing to an idea of mutual backwardness and comparative advantage, is novel.
If both sides are so backward, then which side finds the advantage? Of course, the
entire region might be found advantageous to some other place, such as the commer-
cial and industrial hub of Kunming; however, if the Lancang/Mekong corridor is
opened, wouldn't the advantage gravitate to the more advanced economies of Thailand,
Singapore, and Malaysia?
The question of which direction the border prefecture ofXSBN will gravitate
is difficult to predict. On the one hand, the Chinese government is actively promoting
idea that the Dai people ofXSBN share the "same customs and the same language" as
the Tai ethnic groups living in the surrounding countries. On the other hand, the
forced assimilation of the Dai people into the Chinese-constructed concept of
"minority nationality," the dismantling of the traditional social classes among the Dai
residents ofXSBN, and also the substantial immigration ofHan Chinese into XSBN
have seriously altered any conception of what it means to be Dai.
If, in fact, a new identification of a greater Dai or Tai ethnicity is generated,
both locally and among the people of Thailand, then the strengthening of cultural and
economic ties between them might serve the exclude Han Chinese, and in the long run
create the sort of economic and political tendencies that decades of a closed "bamboo
curtain" sought to stamp out. The real inconsistency appears to be the customary Han
view of the Dai people as a sort of "tribal chieftanship," while the XSBN Dai con-
sidered themselves to be subjects of a thousand-year old kingdom. To evaluate such
incompatible views, let us turn briefly to the history of the Dai people in XSBN.
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D. Endnotes to Chapter 11
1. In September 1995, an expedition led by Michel Peissel claimed to have discovered
the source of the Mekong above the Rup-sa Pass in Qinghai. The river is called Dza
Nak in this area, and is hardly more than a streamlet in the rocky high plains. The sure
identification of which feeder stream is the actual source of a 4,600km long river
remains subject to debate, but nonetheless the trek in pursuit of the Mekong's source
provides a useful depiction of the area. See "In Wild Asia, Caravan to a River's
Source." by Marlise Simons. New York Times (April 17, 1995): Al.
2. Kawagarbo is the Tibetan name for the mountain, the Chinese name is Meili
xueshan. The Mingyong River, which drains down from Kawagarbo into the Lancang.
drops some 4,740 meters over the course of 12 km [Mu. et al 1992: 104, 109]. From
Kawagarbo Peak hangs the Mingyongqia Glacier {mingyong meaning "mirror" in
Tibetan, qia meaning "ice"). Extending for eight kilometers down the face of the
mountain, (from 5,500m elevation down to 2.700m,) the glacier is 500m wide and 73
square km in surface area [Mu, 1992: 108]. This formidable peak has yet to be
conquered by mountain-climbers. A recent expedition by a team Japanese and
Chinese climbers was forced to abandon their climb. See related articles in: Yomiuri
Shinbun (December 5. 1996) and Qiao Bao (December 4. 1996): 26.
3. Formerly known as A'dunzi. this was a major trading outpost on the ancient "tea
and horse" caravan route that connected Yunnan. Sichuan, and Tibet. See also Rock.
1947: 320-322; Mu, et al 1992: 100.
4. The terrain of northwest Yunnan is among the most rugged to be found on the
globe. The noted geographer, T. L. Tregear describes it as: "Deep, steep-sided and
heavily wooded valleys with fast-flowing, un-navigable. and often unfordable rivers...
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CHAPTER III
THE PEOPLES, HISTORY AND ECONOMY OF
- XISHUANGBANNA (XSBN)
A. The Xishuangbanna Dai People
1. Historical Background
According to popular legend and the histories written in the Dai language, the
founding of traditional Dai society is divided into three periods: the time before the
arrival of Buddhism, an early Buddhist era, and the time the Dai Kings. According to
one version, retold under the influence of Marx/Lenin/Mao Zedong ideology, the first
period was called the ganlan^ period, a time "without rulers, without Buddha, and
without burdens (of class)."2 This period is said to date to before 536 B.C.E. The
second period is characterized as a time "with officials, with Buddhism, but without
burdens (of class)," and is dated from 536 B.C.E. to 638 C.E. The third period "had
rulers, had Buddhism, and had the burden of class divisions." Since we do yet not
have written records or extensive archeological evidence to confirm the existence of
the first two periods, the question of dating them is purely speculative. 3
The first overlord, or zhao pianling, of the Dai-Lue people, established the Jin
Dian Kingdom at Jing Rung (today's Jinghong) late in the 12th Century C.E.4 At that
time, the Dali Kingdom, having taken over the domain of the powerful Nanzhao
Kingdom, still controlled most of northern Yunnan, preventing the arrival of Han
Chinese to the areas that now lie in the western and southern parts of Yunnan. The
zhao pianling, according to the Nanzhao records, deferred to the authority of the
Nanzhao King and was given a "golden seal in the shape of a tiger head" to cement th
relationship. 5
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Though not much is known about the political affairs of this kingdom, which
came to be known as Sipsong Panna 6 (or Xishuangbanna in Mandarin,) during the
Mongol onslaught of the late 13th Century C.E., the Yuan government established
Cheli Military Regional Administration at Jing Rung.7 This nominal claim to
suzerainty over XSBN has been used as evidence that the zhao pianling had been
brought into a state of vassalage to the Chinese Empire. However, it has also been
argued that far from becoming a subject of the Chinese, the zhao pianling and his
descendants maintained real and independent control over Sipsong Panna for more
than five centuries. This claim can be partly backed up by the fact that the region was
never again invaded by China.
Indeed, it was not until the occupation of the area by the People's Liberation
Army in the 1950's, when Han Chinese began to know anything about the internal
political structure of Sipsong Panna, the operation of independent principalities, or
even the local place names.8
2. Social Organization of the Dai - Lue Kingdom
The Dai Lue society ofXSBN was traditionally separated into six social
classes, from the aristocratic meng, to the slave class, ka chao.
"The original meaning ofmeng was the top of the skull, and so took its name
from the highest and most valuable part of a person's body."9
The meng class included the zhao pianling, the princes, and their immediate
descendants. The meng class, also known as sadhu, had to be addressed by all of the
other classes as zhao meng (for males) and meng lang (for females). Similarly those
addressing the meng had to refer to themselves with the diminutive forms ofpi (knave)
or ka (slave). 10
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The stratification of the Dai Lue society already possessed a high degree of
complexity by the time the Jing Rung kingdom was established. That the zhao
pianling, or "lord of the broad territory;' was given the designation of a minor tribal
chieftain by the Chinese, should not distort the history of the Dai people and reduce
their social norms of many centuries to an over-simplified stereotype. In fact, the
survival of the Dai - Lue into the present century, offers an interesting example of a
people who were never forcibly acculturated into the dynastic Chinese empire,
escaping the fate of other groups in the southwest region such as the Miao and the
Zhuang. 1
1
3. Network of Dai Kingdoms
Although Sipsong Panna remained outside, or at least at the very periphery of
the Han Chinese sphere of influence, the kingdom maintained long-standing relations
with other Tai states in the greater region. Prof. Hsieh Shih-chung has described a
network of four loosely associated Tai Kingdoms, each with their own overlord. The
Kengtung kingdom of today's Shan State in Burma, the Lan Zhang kingdom in today's
north-western Laos, the Lan Na kingdom in today's northern Thailand, and Sipsong
Panna in today's Yunnan Province operated together in a "tacit alliance," though each
had their own supreme overlord, and the people within each kingdom maintained a
strong sense of their own group identity.
According to Hsieh Shih-chung:
"These four small kingdoms frequently interacted with one another, both in
interstate affairs and in popular contact, before modern nation-states were
formed. People speaking mutually intelligible dialects felt free to move to and
fro. This was an adaptation to encirclement by powerful neighbors: Burma,
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Siam, Mons, Cambodia, and China. When one of the four northern Tai states
was attacked, people could move quickly and safely to other territories to
reside temporarily." 12
With frequent contacts such as these, it is hard to imagine that the Mekong
River was not also of primary importance for communications among the people of
the federated Tai kingdoms. On the other hand, the distinct identities of these four
kingdoms contributed to the pattern of fragmentation of the region when Western
colonial powers began to draw artificial borders between them.
B. Formation of Modern Borders
For the greater part of recorded history, China's borders remained shifting,
amorphous zones of influence, waxing and waning based on long periods of alliance,
rebellion, warfare, banditry, or simple inaccessibility. During the latter part of the
19th Century, XSBN's case was complicated not only by its geographic isolation and
tremendous distance from the Chinese capital, but by the sporadic advances of
colonial powers from the south and west.
Seeking to extend their reach from Burma and Indochina to the Chinese
interior, French and British colonial interests launched expeditions into Yunnan. The
British sought a route from India to the Yangzi River, through Burma and Yunnan;
while the French dreamed of opening a "river road" to China by navigating the
Mekong. 13 By the end of the Qing Dynasty, both Britain and France had annexed
some parts of XSBN, and the treaties which were subsequently forced upon the
Imperial government in Peking marked off borders of the areas in question for the first
time. 14
Ethnographers engaged in research of northern Thailand have provided
insights into the partitioning of the region into sections of Laos, Thailand, Myanmar,
Viet Nam, and Yunnan. For example, Nicholas Tapp, who wrote:
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impact ofcolonialism on the region has been considerable, in economicas well as polity terms, and it seems clear that very different notions oftemtonalism must have prevailed in the region in the pre-capitalist periodwhether these were the notions of the lowland rulers of states and2 or
tlZf 7f*
er
V
m°refPerSed»-Yet today, the border is andhas af ected the hves of the ethnic minorities who find themselves onoS
or the other or both of it, to a very considerable degree."l5
This observation applies most convincingly to the Dai people, who have found their
confederation split up into five different nations, and their people dislodged, and
crowded out of their traditional land holdings. In XSBN, where the Dai people had
been in the majority for many centuries, the arrival ofHan Chinese drastically altered
the demographic picture.
C. Communist Consolidation
XSBN was first occupied by the People's Liberation Army in the early 1950s,
and was established as the first of Yunnan's Autonomous areas in 1953. The capital,
Cheli, was renamed Yunjinghong, a Chinese transliteration of its original name in the
Dai language (which meant "city of dawn"). At that time, the Han population of
XSBN was almost nonexistent. 16
The administrative units ofXSBN were set up in accord with the original
twelve banna, plus three districts. 17 However, the process of setting up district level
administrations took place slowly, and the banna were reorganized several times
between 1953 and 1958. In 1958 XSBN was divided into the three main admin-
istrative counties: Jinghong, Menghai, and Mengla, which have remained unchanged
to the present day.
The presence of Communist cadres engaged in promoting the new regime and
in administrative organizing during the early 50's, was the first time Han Chinese had
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taken up residence in the tropical valleys ofXSBN. Although training of minority
nationality cadres was underway at the newly opened Nationalities Institute in
Kunming, the P.R.C. government also recognized the hereditary Dai ruler of XSBN,
Zhao Cunxin, by presenting him with an official seal of office. 18 The Communist
party fully recognized that the traditional social structure of XSBN, with its hereditary
princes, land taxes, and social classes, was still intact, and the official policy was to
"unite the headmen" of the meng and villages. This formed the groundwork for
extensive land reforms, which divided up the royal holdings ofXSBN among the zhao
meng (or lesser princes), and then with their aid the local residents came into posses-
sion of the land they farmed. 19
Despite the progress of land reform in XSBN, in 1956 nearly 20,000 house-
holds were found to be still paying land tributes to local leaders. The average tribute
amounted to some 30% of the household income.20 Even such burdensome traditions
as paying tax tribute were deeply ingrained into the Dai people, but they were
gradually wiped out during a period of active suppression of ethnic identity and re-
education, when those of the zhao class had to renounce their aristocratic privileges. 21
Even though the experience of the Dai people during the last fifty years has
included the castigating of their traditions, breaking off their connections with the Tai
peoples of bordering states, and fostering a synthetic Dai identity as an ethnic minority
of the greater Chinese nation, still the Dai people and all the minorities of Yunnan
have, in recent years, been called upon to preserve and display their ethnicity and
"traditional customs." What the Han Chinese see as traditional are certain stereotyped
forms, certain costumes and rituals which they have long associated with a particular
ethnic group, and these are now being linked with a burgeoning folk culture
industry 22 Whether the commoditization of culture serves to strengthen tradition, or
to water it down for mass-production is a dilemma now being faced by the minority .
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population in Yunnan, among whom the Dai are in the unique position of being
heralded as a cultural and linguistic bridge to international trade.
D. Ethnicity and Trade
Official Chinese plans to open up the Lancang Corridor often cite the
advantage of international cultural and linguistic ties of the ethnic minorities, such as
the Dai people, in expanding border trade. This raises the question of the degree of
commonalty that still exists between the people who have been separated by inter-
national borders and subjected to the exigencies of political change and upheaval ever
since. Are we more likely to see unity or factionalism among the ethnic groups being
labeled as sharing the same roots? In the words of Mr. Gehan Wijeyewardene:
"The boundaries we know are arbitrary and Thai (Tai) ethnicity is various and
malleable....Yet community of language and ethnic identification, and the ways
in which these are thought of and written about, are potentially factors, as are
the natural facts of topography in determining frontiers."23
Therefore we must also take into consideration the idea of a greater Dai - Tai ethnic
unity, whether it is being developed as a model of existing phenomena, or whether it is
a surface manipulation with ulterior motives. In either case, there might be a
fundamental attractiveness, or a new form of self-identification for the Dai people,
even if there is no historical justification for either.24
1. Background of "Ethnic" Border Trade in XSBN
One way to examine cross-border ethnic relationships is to consider the
volume and extent of border trade that existed before 1950, and how it has changed
since then. According to a recent study of the development of ethnic trade:
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Before 1949, the economy ofXSBN was completely backward, and the local
peoples' commerce was extremely weak. There were only a few dozen small
shops and stalls selling firewood, salt, kerosene, cloth and some thirty-odd
commercial goods."25
This statement suggests that there was neither a flourishing ethnic trade, nor a
strong commercial network to support its development. It does not take into account
the traditional subsistence agriculture and self-sufficiency that makes many of the
more familiar Chinese trade items unnecessary. Also, it fails to include as local com-
merce the flourishing cross-border trade. The same study goes on to state that, before
1950, the border people ofXSBN, Laos, and Myanmar had long standing trade
relations:
"...with an annual volume of more than 3 million yuan, it promoted the
neighboring countries' production, and fulfilled all the daily needs of the
people. "26
Despite these contradictory statements, we can at least venture to say that there
was some form of border trade going on when the Chinese first entered the region, and
that the set-up of commercial outlets in XSBN was either concealed or quite unstruc-
tured from the Han Chinese point of view. Under the Han Chinese administration in
the early 1950's: "
'
"The Party paid great attention to ethnic trade, and used ethnic trade to check
the links of advancing economic relations between the Party, the nation, and
the minority nationalities."27
To carry out this mission, four Peoples' Trading Company branch offices were set up
in XSBN, with 1 14 employees. Facing the complete lack of infrastructure:
"...they used caravans of horses and cattle to haul in Shanghai dried vegetables,
Sichuan pickled mustard preserves, Guizhou peanuts, Dali salted meat and
other goods."28
44
The strangest example of these prodigious efforts to unite the markets of
central China with the remote tropical border region ofXSBN is surely found in the
importation of these items- in a lush rain forest mil of bananas, mangoes, and
aromatics, and in the towns that subsisted on their own rice paddies and vegetable
plots, as well as fish from the rivers and streams, what use would the local people have
for old dried vegetables dragged in on a caravan from distant Shanghai? As for the
dried meats of Dali, it is hard to imagine them as a particularly desirable or unusual
staple, since Tibetan and other merchant caravans had been bringing them along on
their tea-trading missions for many centuries.29 ln fact, these trade goods sound more
like the staples needed by the Han Chinese themselves, as they moved into areas
where they had uncertain sources of grain or other sustenance, and completely lacked
any traditional rights to land tenure.
The local commerce ofXSBN was further developed by an official policy of
government price subsidies, which sought to integrate XSBN into the provincial
economy and to place the tropical resources of the area within the reach of buyers on
the provincial and national levels. Prices were slashed in 1954, 1958, and 1963, with
a total reduction of more than 30%. Goods were available in state-run stores at retail
prices 1 5 to 40% below those found in private stores, and in this way:
"...the waves of foreign merchandise in the market were resisted, the
exploitation of the masses by private merchants was reduced, prices were
stabilized, and the peoples' lives were improved."30
Local commerce was drawn slowly into the Chinese state socialist sphere in a
deliberate effort to cut off contact with external markets. In 1950, there were 21 cross-
border market towns, but by 1990 there were only 10, a 52% reduction. Also, between
the late 50's and early 80's, local officials who followed the "leftist" ideology were
afraid of "making mistakes," and discouraged import /export, which resulted in a
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reduction of trade in the open ports of some 25 to 60% of former years' totals 3 1 In
short, we can see that up until the introduction of economic liberalization in the 1990's,
the sum result of building up ethnic trade in XSBN has been to wean it away from
cross-border trade and make it dependent on the greater provincial economy of
Yunnan and its industrial center in Kunming.
2. Ethnic Trade as a Key to Opening the Border
In the light of the "closed door" policies of the past, what are the implications
of new international re-alignments for the prefecture ofXSBN? Since the perimeter of
XSBN lies directly along the borders of the countries in the "golden quadrangle", there
is no doubt that it will became a major artery for trade and shipping. The question is,
what percentage of this trade will directly involve local people, and what percentage
will merely pass through on its way to somewhere else? In many Chinese analyses
and projections for XSBN border trade, there is a recurrent theme of "ethnic trade," a
rather loosely defined term which is supposed to arise from the shared linguistic and
cultural ties of the residents in the adjacent areas of XSBN, Laos, Myanmar, and
Northern Thailand.
The notion of a renascence of cross-border cultural ties, based upon the
persistence of small scale caravan trade and family visits across the permeable border-
lines does not seem to have any concrete plan or policy behind it. However, based on
the surge in activity at the border points being opening in XSBN, trade could very well
take off and surpass all expectations.32 With the backing of local officials in Jinghong,
and the continued improvement of roads and river transport, the Dai people might find
themselves in a unique position for entrepreneurship. Even so, they must first
overcome very significant obstacles in terms of poverty, lack of education and job
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training, and lack of capital for investment in their own businesses. At the same time,
the Dai people will be subject to a host of secondary effects such as urbanization,
dislocation, and pollution of the unique tropical ecology of XSBN. These social and
environmental factors will be examined in the following chapter, which focuses on the
current conditions of the people in XSBN and their imminent encounter with the
world economy.
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E. Endnotes to Chapter III
1. ffitK "ganlan" in Modern Chinese means "olive." My inquiries into an alternate
meaning for this word in the context of Dai society have yet to produce any results, hut
I believe that the word refers not to olives, but to a characteristic form of Dai
architecture. This assumption is based on two phrases: (the Jinuo people) "live high
in the mountains, occupying ganlan ^pfji style bamboo houses" [Wang, 1993: 321].
And, in The History ofthe Dai People, we find: "The residences of the Dai People are
exactly gan Ian ^fil style architecture..." [Jiang, 1983: 579]. If we follow my
suggestion, then a possible reading for the towns of Xiaoganlanba and Daganlanba. are
the "small basin of bamboo thatch houses," and the "large basin of bamboo thatch
houses," which seems to make sense in the context of small port towns at either
extreme of the traditional XSBN Dai domain. I therefore maintain that ganlan is more
likely a transcription of a native word, then a translation of the native word for "olive."
2. This and following quotes on the three early periods of Dai society are from GT.IJ.
1990: 147.
3. The entry of Buddhism into Dai society is an intriguing problem. Since the vast
majority of XSBN's books written in the Dai language were sought out and destroyed
during the Cultural Revolution, there aren't any indigenous records to go on. An early
contemporary account of the XSBN region is found in the record of Fan Chuo a
Chinese official who described his escape from An Nan (Viet Nam) through Yunnan
during the 9th century. Fan Chuo describes a land where water buffalo and elephants
were used as draft animals, but doesn't make specific mention of Buddhism [Luce,
1961]. There are other accounts of the Kuan Yin cult in northern Yunnan, and
speculations about the spread of Buddhism during the 8th century from India [Howard.
1990: 9]. Yunnan legends tell of wandering monks from India who performed
strange rituals and magic acts, such as the dancing monk Luomin [Yang. 1881
:
13514]. But the Theravada Buddhism practiced by the Dai people must have entered
from the south, via Burma or Thailand, and should therefore be approached by
studying the dissemi-nation of Theravadan Buddhism from Sri Lanka. Although there
are many differing opinions about the time of dissemination of Buddhism into
southwest China, it seems to me highly unlikely that the spread occurred during the
lifetime of the historical Buddha, and for this reason alone, we should be extremely
skeptical about accepting any dates without concrete evidence.
4. The term Dai-Lue is a compound of Dai. which is a word coined (in the 1950's)
to describe the greater ethnic group of Tai people in Yunnan; and hue. Wl which is
the word that XSBN Dai people previously used to refer to themselves. An earlier
form of reference to the Dai people was Meng hue. SB One interpretation for
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meng is the 'tribe' or 'territory,' and for lue: 'native place' [GTJJ, 1990: 1441. Meng
can also refer to the Dai nobility (see note 9, below), and in Thai the word meng
means: 'town.' The overlord of the XSBN kingdom was called the zhao pianling, g
) t'pi'i which is also commonly transcribed according to the Dai pronunciation: chao
phacndin. (To avoid confusion, Dai terms will be referred to with Mandarin
transcriptions, and alternate Dai spellings will be provided in footnotes.) Hsieh offers
a rendering of Dai-Lue as: "the people who call themselves Dai, live in Lue. and share
equally in making their chao phacndin a satisfied king" [Hsieh, 1995: 307]. Although
the term Dai was initially accepted by the Dai people as an improvement over, Pai yi.
[']
'M (a pejorative Chinese term,) it lumped several different independent Dai groups
together under one ambiguous label. More recently, the XSBN Dai began to refer to
themselves as Xi Dai Sffl; while the Dehong Dai people began to call themselves
De Dai {§{§ [Hsieh, 1995: 316-326]. Regarding the terms Dai and Tai, there has
been some effort made to clear up the distinction between Thai, (the people of
Thailand), Tai. (the inclusive term for those sharing Tai ethnicity, or the greater Thai),
and Dai (a term concocted as a label for a "minority nationality" people by the
Chinese). Further discussion of this difficult, but crucial subject is found in
Wijeyewardene. 1990: 48-50. Chao (zhao), was a "ruler" or "king." Phacndin {pian
ling), meant roughly "the broad land." or "the entire land." See also the "Role of the
chao phacndin: Ethnic Identity as Subjecthood" in Hsieh, 1995: 303-307. The
Kingdom of Jin Dian, or "Kingdom of the Golden Temple." was located at Jing Rung,
the place variously known as: Kenghong. Chiengrung. Xieng Hong, Cheli. and
Jingdong. See MZYJ, 1958: 254; Lebar, 1964: 210; and Zang, 1966: 417.
5. Hsieh, 1995: 308-309.
6. Sipsong Panna. or the "twelve banna" has been variously explained as referring to
twelve regions, fiefdoms. or taxable lands. Sipsong is the Thai word for the number
'twelve.' It's unclear whether ban refers to the Thai word for 'house' (ban), or
'thousand' (pan). Na is generally accepted as referring to 'land, field.' As a geographic
name, Sipsong Panna has a parallel in the Sip Song Chao Thai of Northern Viet Nam.
A discussion of various interpretations of the name Sipsong Panna is found in Lebar.
1964: 210-211.
7. Zang, 1966: 417.
8. Hsieh. 1995: 313-314. The best overviews of the "tribal chieftanship" system, or ///
,v/. [
-
h'J can be found in Wiens. 1967: 213-228; Huang, 1968; Yu. 1968; and
Lombard-Salmon, 1972. Descriptions of the Mongol and Ming conquests of Yunnan,
and the general state of carnage and chaos that these entailed are found in Lighte,
1981:83-85.
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9. Author's translation from MZYJ. 1958: 256. Meng, J£ (or muong) being the name
for the noble class, also referred to the areas under their dominion, which were ruled
by zhao meng §s5i . The entire area of XSBN was. at one time, divided among more
than thirty zhao meng, and under each zhao meng were smaller local administrations
down to the level of villages. The lower ranking headmen of outlying and mountain-
ous areas were called huoxi ikM and man §|. The titles meng and man are still the
most common of place names in XSBN. See also: GTJJ, 1990: 148.
10. Below meng* the weng class included the extended family of the zhao pianling,
their relatives and descendants. Both the weng and meng classes were supported by
taxes collected from farmers, who lived on the hereditary taxable lands of the nobility,
on rented plots, on sharecropped plots, or worked as slaves on the land of their
designated masters.
The lu long duo ha, l^fiPiMHA composing the third class, were originally
descendants of the second class and often became headmen of meng or smaller local
administrations. Most of the headmen had enfoeffments or taxable lands also, and
were primarily responsible for supervising agricultural production and collecting taxes
to be handed over to the nobility.
The fourth social class, the Dai meng, fltlm sometimes called gun hen meng
^^jnL w'ere the earliest residents of the XSBN territory, occupying a fairly large
amount of the land. The fifth class were the Dai ling nan, fllMEI or gun ling nan, ?K
fJIO which were divided into two major groups. The first group were those
immediately subordinate to the zhao pianling, and were called ling nan nai WMUh
(nai meaning "internal"). The second group were those subordinate to other nobility
and officials, and were called ling nan nuo vMMWi (nuo meaning "external").
The sixth class was that of ka zhao, -fcQ also called hong hai long
Hong hai referred to landless persons of any class who did not farm, while the hong
hai long were those landless peasants of the lowest social class who served as slaves.
The ka hen \<i? were the household slaves of the zhao pianling, over whom was a
supervisory class of slaves called meng. The meng were usually made slaves after
being captured in battle, or as a punishment for a crime. If the meng slaves
transgressed a second time they were sentenced to death. During the 40's three meng
were beheaded according to this custom in Mengla. This description of the Dai social
classes in XSBN is drawn from MZYJ, 1958: 254-60.
11. Descriptions of the violent absorption of neighboring Guizhou and subsequent
Miao rebellions are fully documented in Lombard-Salmon, 1972.
12. Hsieh, 1995: 306.
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13. On the French dream of opening the Mekong, see deCarne. 1 872. and Hafner. et
al, 1983. On the British / French rivalry in the Mekong region, see also Hirshfield.
1968. A detailed study of the British parliamentary debates on the Burma - Yunnan
railroad is found in Chandran. 1971.
14. Details on the geography and demarcation of the Burmese border are found in
Zhang, 1937. In 1 897, the French took one of the banna, including the towns of
Mengwu and Wude, incorporating them into Laos. These remain in present-day Laos
(22'15'N by 101 o 50'E) [GTJJ, 1990: 144].
15. Tapp. 1990: 149.
16. Moseley, 1973: 66. After 1950 there was a flood of Han immigration into XSBN,
and by 1956 there were some 18.000 Han residents; by 1982. the Han population had
surged to 185.000 [GTJJ. 1990: 140]. Prof. E.C. Chapman noted that the expansion of
rubber plantations along the border areas of Yunnan allowed the Han Chinese to
strengthen their position in an area formerly dominated by a non-Han population.
Though numbering only a few hundred in 1940. "...by 1988. after a rapid in-migration
of Han Chinese from Kunming and beyond, the total population had grown to 700.000.
of whom one-third were said to be Han Chinese. ...one-third comprised people from 12
other minorities, and one third were Dai" [Chapman. 1991: 41]. See also YNDZ,
1988: 5,43.
17. Officially, there were four administrative districts in 1949: Cheli, Fohai. Nanjiao,
and Zhenyue. In 1953 they were dissolved and the prefectural administration was set
up with twelve banna: Banna Jinghong, Banna Menghai, Banna Mengwang. Banna
Yiwu, Banna Mengpeng, Banna Menghun, Banna Mengzhe, Banna Mengyang, Banna
Mengla, Banna Menglun, Banna Meng'a, Banna Mandun; and three districts: (1
)
Gelan and Hani People's Autonomous District, (2) Yiwu Yao People's Autonomous
District, and (3) the Bulang Mountain Bulang People's Autonomous District [YNDZ.
1988:4].
18. Zhao's acceptance speech reads like a tract from Communist propaganda office,
demonstrating his ability to adapt to circumstances. The support of the preferred
Chinese policy also conforms to the traditional pattern of Dai-Han political relations,
as described by Prof. Hsieh. However, "...in jeopardy of losing their ethnic-state, the
Tai were still following, at the time of the struggle between the Nationalists and
Communists, their accustomed practice of supporting either of those two powerful
Chinese regimes. They thought this was the only way for the Tai state to survive, not
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realizing that their ability to decide their own ethnic-political fate had disappeared
forever" [Hsieh, 1995: 325]. For a partial translation of Zhao's speech, see Moseley,
1973: 1 14. Zhao went on to serve as Prefect of XSBN for the next fortv vears! See
also Zhao and Wu, 1991.
19. Moseley, 1973: 116-17.
20. GTJJ, 1990: 150.
21. From 1957 until the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Dai were involved in the
same class struggles and re-education that held sway throughout China [Hsieh. 1995:
326-27].
22. See for example, the "ethnic" souvenir factories described in Swain, 1995.
23. Wijeyewardene, 1990: 71.
24. Take for example the metamorphosis of the Dai opinion of "brutal Siamese" to a
new-found interest in Thailand as "a great and wealthy Buddhist country." Meanwhile
the Lue people in Thailand, according to Hsieh, maintain a hostility to Thai-Siamese,
while fondly picturing their relationship with the Lue "homeland" in Sipsong Panna
[Hsieh. 1995: 328].
25. Author's translation of GTJJ. 1 990: 231.
26. Author's translation of GTJJ. 1990: 236.
27. Author's translation of GTJJ. 1990: 232.
28. Author's translation of GTJJ. 1990: 232.
29. Hill. 1989.
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30. Author's translation from GTJJ, 1990: 233. Despite the price subsidies, border
trade seemed to account for the greater part of local commerce well into the 1950's.
As reported in Commerce in the Tai Autonomous Region ofSipsong Panna, "Before
Liberation, almost all of the-Sipsong Panna market was taken up by foreign trade. At
that time a relatively large amount of barter in tea. camphor, etc. was done with
Thai land....Apart from trading in salt, tea and cigarettes, in the latter half of 1950, 90%
of the remaining trade of the Fohai Branch Trading Corporation (which
included. ..Cheli, Daluo, and Menglong) was made up of imported commodities..."
See Narramore. 1988: 9-10.
31. "...owing to the influence of leftist ideology" ^^k&^^MBW- [GTJJ. 1990:
236]; "cadres in the commercial units were afraid of making mistakes" |lfj Tin|j|"Jl'l'j
R^tSMifll [GTJJ, 1990:237].
32. A brief description is found in "The Thriving Yunnan Border Trade." China
Pictorial. 4 (1993): 8-11.
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CHAPTER IV
SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF DEVELOPMENT
Despite the tremendous changes that the opening of the Lancang (Mekong)
corridor promises to bring to XSBN, surprisingly little has been said about the social
and environmental impacts that the development will bring to the entire prefecture.
Many of the articles published on the subject are written from a top-down point of
view, examining the policies and loosely defined prospects for economic integration,
\
without mentioning much, if anything, about the conditions on the ground. On the
S
other hand, there are some articles which show a greater sensitivity to basic problems
facing the local society ofXSBN, and some comparison and contrast ofthese points of
view will help to illustrate the basic situation ofXSBN's residents.
A. Labor Issues in the Border Region
On the subject of skilled labor in XSBN, we find it characterized as unskilled
and uneducated:
"Owing to the backward state of education in this region, the quality of human
resources is rather low, there is a widespread lack of skilled labor and technical
personnel, which poses a major obstacle to economic development." 1
Therefore, from very the start, the local people remain largely unprepared for the
increased pace of modernization, and their lack of technical training will tend to
exclude them from new job opportunities.
Liu Zhi, who works in the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences,
expresses his sympathy, urging that the problem should be addressed by organizing
and actively training the local people in science and technical skills. He advocates on- .
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the-job training and exchanging technical personnel with other agencies, as well as the
establishment of a GMS network for consultation, technology transfer, and exchange
of information.2 >
By contrast, Peng Yong'an, sees an economic comparative advantage in the
backwardness of border residents.
"With the same cultural roots, and similar social customs, the people's standard
of living and their levels of production are basically positioned at the same low
level. Historically, the social and economic relations within and without the
border region are close, and will be beneficial for developing border trade and
foreign-directed processing industries."3
Thus, the local residents are supposed to be useful as cultural connections for business,
and at the same time, cheap labor. It is precisely the search for economic advantage
in opening XSBN that poses the most serious challenge to the local population. The
fact that their labor is cheap and unskilled does not appear to promise any real
economic growth, as far as they are concerned.
B. Poverty and Economic Development
The issue of real poverty, and its alleviation by means of "development," is a
controversial subject. No less so in Yunnan, where inaccessible areas still have a very
high percentage of people who are practicing subsistence agriculture. In the eyes of
many economists, because subsistence farmers have no measurable GNP, they are said
to be living in dire poverty. According to Liu Zhi, the border region accounts for
some 50% of Yunnan's total land area, 50% of Yunnan's land under cultivation, and
40% of the province's population; and yet in 1989, the border region's income
accounted for only 28% of the provincial total, and expenditures only 1 5%. Of the 41
most impoverished counties in Yunnan, 23 were in border prefectures. "In recent years,
the gap between border ethnic areas and economic zones is continuing to widen."4
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However, it should not be assumed that the problem has gone unnoticed by the
Yunnan Provincial government. In fact, their continued efforts to address the urban /
rural income gap, and huge investments in building up the transport inrrastructure,
have been instrumental in solidifying the economic relations between the industrial
and financial hub of Kunming and the border regions. For example, when pro-
curements of agricultural products dropped in the first half of 1990 (by 5.7% com-
pared to the previous year), rural residents had no money to purchase consumer goods.
In August 1990, the Provincial government enacted emergency measures to boost the
sluggish economy. Limits were removed on the purchase of agricultural staples,
warehouses were set up, and protective prices established for certain items such as
rubber, pepper, and star anise. In addition, policies were enacted to market industrial
goods in rural areas. A fixed proportion of goods that were in short supply would go
to rural markets. These measures reportedly reversed the economic slowdown, and in
any case, they demonstrate the attention that the Provincial government pays to the
interdependence of rural and urban economic growth.6
1
.
Strategies for Economic Growth
In 1991, the Yunnan government held a Development Strategy Conference in
order to address the uneven geographic distribuition of economic growth in the
province. The conference came up with four strategies, summarized roughly as
follows:
1 . Develop mountainous regions
Goal: To bring the remote, backward, and poverty-stricken areas up to
a higher standard of living.
Strategy Rejected: The mountains of 69 out of 128 counties are too
inaccessible. Additionally, the variations in climate, soils, and agricultural
conditions are too diverse to address without overly complex analysis.
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2. Develop minority regions and border regions
Goal: By making use of existing ethnic cohesion, develop along
community lines. In addition, take advantage of language and cultural
connections to increase international exchange with bordering countries.
Strategy Rejected: The needs and interests of Yunnan's ethnic
minorities are too diverse to reach a consensus on projects and funding.
3. Develop western Yunnan
Goal: To bring the very poor western counties up to the standard of
living of the more prosperous eastern plateau region.
Strategy Rejected: Impassable mountains and no infrastructure.
.
4. Partition Yunnan into Economic Zones
Goal: Zones would be established, each based on an urban industrial
and communications center. Materials and labor from the countryside would
be absorbed by the industrial center, while money, jobs, and infrastructure
would radiate outward.7
Though not formally agreed upon, the last strategy has been the model for
economic development in Yunnan. It is simply another example of the growth-pole
model that has been widely applied in underdeveloped regions in order to promote
economic growth. This strategy reflects the tack being taken in China since the
economic reforms of the 1980's, when the "open door" policy permitted regional
disparities in trade, investment and technological innovation. As applied in China, the
idea is to allow coastal areas to exploit their advantages and develop a highly skilled
labor force, superior management, and to absorb advanced technology. According to a
theory dubbed the "ladder step doctrine," the coastal cities would act as growth poles
and then diffuse technology and skills throughout the mainland. There was, however,
an "anti-ladder step doctrine," which argued that the interior regions must receive
equal development investments in order to exploit energy and resources needed for
industrial production in coastal areas. The "anti-ladder" advocates felt that interior
regions would never achieve "take-off" by diffusion.8
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The idea that economic growth will naturally diffuse across the region is
especially problematic in the rugged mountain regions of Yunnan. Whether cut off by
snowfall and avalanches, as the northwest region often is, or plagued with malaria and
tropical fevers, as is the case in XSBN, Yunnan's border areas have forever been some
of the most inaccessible spots on earth. Although traditional caravan trade, and
shipping by pirogue linked XSBN with neighboring regions in Burma, Thailand, and
Laos, these relations were seasonal and largely dependent weather conditions. The
massive Chinese road-building projects of the last several decades, and more recently,
the opening of regional airports, have reduced delays caused by rain and flooding, and
consequently have greatly increased contacts between local people in Yunnan and the
"outside" world.
2. The Transport Network as a Key to Growth
Provincial investments in transport and communications infrastructure have
also increased dramatically in recent years. In 1992, investments were up 130% over
the previous year,9 and in 1993 the governor, He Zhiqiang, made public a plan to
invest 10 billion RMB (US$ 1.2 billion) in transport and communication networks. 10
The push to improve the province-wide transport network in Yunnan has been
accelerating, and at the same time GMS plans call for linking up land, water, and air
communications with surrounding nations. Though the effects of improved and
expanded road networks, such as the Kunming/Daluo highway in XSBN, are just
beginning to emerge, we can also compare the findings of research conducted in
similar geographic and ethnically diverse contexts, such as those found in northern
Thailand.
58
For example, when evaluating the numerous highland development projects
conducted in Thailand during the 1960's and 1970's, Peter and Sally Kunstadter found:
"The most far-reaching change of this period has been the building of roads
into and through the highlands. This has vastly increased the flow of
lowlanders to the highlands, modifying the traditional patterns of population
movement and altering the basis, scope and techniques of land use....Low-cost
minibus transportation networks proliferated and greatly amplified the volume
and range of daily population movements for marketing, education, and
participation in the urban (and sometimes rural) labor force." 1
1
Surely the same social forces are at work in XSBN, mobilising sections of the popu-
lation which previously had no access to border markets or urban areas. Will this tend
to alleviate rural poverty, or will it create new problems?
An example of the social impact caused by opening the Lancang River is found
in a study by Liu Daqing, of Yunnan's Transport Bureau, Navigation Section:
"Living along both shores of the Lancang River is one third of Yunnan's
population, of which one fourth are ethnic minorities. Owing to lack of of
adequate transport, today one fourth of these people still have not got enough
food and clothing, and are living in extremely backward social and economic
conditions. Within the river basin, average industrial and agricultural
production per capita is only 386 yuan, which only amounts to 65% of the
provincial average, and 43% of the national average. In the ethnic districts of
higher elevations, transport is virtually nonexistent, the people survive on slash
and bum agriculture, lack medicine, live in miserable and dire conditions, and
they desperately need improved communications. In this respect, Lancang
River traffic can be a very useful tool to alleviate poverty and bring prosperity
to the people in the river basin region. For example, before opening up traffic
on the Lancang, the people of Huitang Village in Menghai County could only
live up in the mountains, it was extremely difficult to make contact with people
elsewhere, and the average income was only 30 yuan. But since river traffic
reached this village in 1980, the people have moved down to the shores of the
river to cultivate cash crops, and their average income has jumped to 300
yuan."M
Although Liu's example purports to show the beneficial effects of opening
river traffic to remote villages, it also begs several questions. First, is the shift from
subsistence economy to cash economy always beneficial for the local people? And
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second, assuming that there is a strong incentive to cash in on the river traffic, what
about the communities more than 20 km from the river's edge? Will they also want to
relocate? What about communities 50 km away, or even 100 km distant? It should be
worth observing the distance that communities are willing to travel to get near the
water's edge and grow cash crops to load onto passing boats. What springs to mind is
not the convenience of an isolated community moving down the side of a mountain,
but of a mad rush to colonize the river's edge, a competition for limited amounts of
cultivable land among ten million people, and in short, a nightmare of agricultural
off, erosion, and wastewater in areas that have no facilities. The picture really is
beginning to look like an "Oriental Danube" after all, but not the sort of Danube the
promoters are envisioning.
run-
C. The Trend Toward Urbanization
As the road network connects remote areas in southwest Yunnan with the
Lancang River and other transport hubs, increased mobility will bring more and more
people to regional markets, towns, and cities. The movement of population, as noted
by the Kunstadters, will have concomitant effects on the local society. In the area
around Pa Pae village, in northwest Thailand, where an all-weather road was
completed along an ancient caravan route, there was a rapid substitution of plastic
goods for traditional water-resistant materials. The local residents began to purchase
manufactured goods in place of their own hand-made goods, and rapidly assimilated
elements of consumer culture which they hadn't experienced before.
"By 1980, such modern fashions as electronic watches, sunglasses, jogging
shoes, warm-up pants and be-sloganed T-Shirts ('Yamaha', 'Cambridge
University', Snoopy', and 'Charlie Brown') had reached Pa Pae. These were
not just a conspicuous sign of modernized consumption, but also signalled
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deep-seated environmental and local economic changes (the loss of land
traditionally used for cotton swiddens, the increased opportunity cost of home-
made as opposed to purchased clothing, and increasing participation in modern
world-wide consumption styles." 13
The same phenomena are already evident in the cities of Yunnan. Increased
opportunities for earnings only serve to quicken the pace of change, drawing more
people into the city, and creating a local variation of the "floating population" problem,
which has sent an estimated 100 million people in search ofjobs throughout China. 14
Yunjinghong, being the main intersection of air, highway and river traffic, is
becoming the hub of XSBN.
The Jinghong Airport opened in 1 990, taking over the old Simao route. By
mid- 1995 the airport was handling 52 flights per week. During the same five-year
period, the airport handled 600,000 passengers, 240,000 of them in 1994 alone. 15 To
this booming domestic service, Jinghong Airport added an international route to
Bangkok in April 1996, becoming the second airport in Yunnan open to foreign
aircraft. 16
For a city the size of Yunjinghong (with an estimated population of 50,000),
the presence of an airport handling a quarter of a million arrivals and departures every
year signals a huge impact on the urban environment. Needs are created for
transportation to and from the airport, for lodging, and for restaurants, where
previously they didn't exist. According to the Omnibus ofEconomy and Trade in
Yunnan's Border Region, the first Dai restaurant in Yunjinghong did not open for
business until 1986, and by 1993 there were 19 Dai cuisine restaurants crowded
together along the same street, "creating a great ambiance for Yunjinghong."! 7
New arrivals, traffic, commerce, and affluence are transforming both social
forms and architectural forms. Traditional Dai houses, which were built on raised
platforms, had single rooms, tall thatched rooves, and stalls for livestock built on the
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ground beneath them (See Fig. 22) are being replaced by new forms of housing. Some
are built from heavier timber, instead of bamboo and thatch, with separate rooms and
modem appliances upstairs, as well as divided grain storage areas and pens below.
The most modem, "third generation" Dai houses, are made of brick, with seperate bed-
rooms, kitchens and living rooms, and seem to have consigned the creaking bamboo
platforms, with all their charms and hassles, to the realm of memory. 1 8 These archi-
tectural innovations are in stark contrast to local tradition in XSBN, where:
"In 1982, 60% of the entire prefecture's rural commercial network points
consisted of grass huts, with woven bamboo walls. The remaining 40% were
small salesrooms of the simplest construction." 19
Today, some of these huts have been taken down and replaced with an
international airport capable of landing Boeing 737's. The urban forms of
Yunjinghong are facing sudden extinction, as investments pour in, seemingly from
nowhere, and transform the landscape into something the local residents might have
seen on television. Symbolic of these changes is the opening of a four-storey tall
department store, now being renovated by a Thai oil company.20 Presumably the
people of Yunjinghong will no longer have to wait for policy decisions in Kunming to
find manufactured goods, but it remains to be seen if a foreign joint venture store will
stock merchandise that they can afford to buy.
These changes in Yunjinghong will radiate outward, impacting satellite towns.
For example, Manjinglan, a 'tourism development zone' of 6.8 square km, has been set
up on the outskirts of town,21 and is reportedly a great success, both commercially and
in preserving local architectural forms.22 Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that the
future ofXSBN will see new styles and materials for construction, and new archi-
tectural forms that will alter the landscape. In addition, urbanization will produce
conflicts over land for new construction, as well as generate noise, air, and water
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pollution for populations unused to dealing with such problems. What we are seeing
in XSBN, is not a "frontier" economy, as much as a self-contained region being
thrown open to the forces of the world market, and forced to shape a new identity as it
grapples with unfamiliar terms and conditions.
D
-
Meeting of the "Frontier" and the World Economy
Building up bases for extraction of gems and minerals, tropical forest products,
and border trade, as well as building up secondary and tertiary industries for proces-
sing and manufacturing, all seem to indicate that the lush forests ofXSBN will soon
be competing for space with a formidable array of capital intensive projects. Instead
of a "frontier," we should conceive ofXSBN as a new "center," facing rapid urban-
ization from the start along with the pressures of the world market that will be sending
ships and barges to Yunjinghong ever more frequently.
The situation is in some respects similar to the transformation of sparsely
populated rainforests of the Amazon into gold rush towns. One hopes that rampant
exploitation of the jungle will not occur in XSBN, and yet even Liu Zhi, who wrote
with great concern about the plight of unskilled border residents, does not extend his
sympathies to preserving natural forests. Liu Zhi goes on to illustrate the great natural
resources available in impoverished border areas, and in the adjacent regions of
northern Viet Nam, Laos, Thailand, and Burma, including a:
"green treasure house of more than 40% forest cover. It holds in store great
quantities of high grade woods, such as teak, Phoebe nanmu, Mesua ferrea,
ebony, sandalwood, sanderswood, etc..."23
Liu Zhi's litany of valuable woods, many of which stand in government
protected forests, should serve as a warning of their vulnerability. Unscrupulous
traders, corporations in search of timber inputs, and even local residents seduced by
cash rewards might wreak havoc on the remaining forests.
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A study of regional ecology in Yunnan found that:
rate of destructionSfaST -T^™ exPloita'i°n of forests....^
exploitation reached 39Son^ * °f r~-I" 1985, timber
consumed, 57.2 percent w~ for H„ T " Yuman *e timber
burned as firewood H nT muctoTth T"'
°f*** 52^ Wasu. nence, h ofthe forest is consumed as fuel."24
This distressing scenario is espectaHy severe in XSBN, where the fores, cover was
est.ma.ed as higher than 70% in the 1950's, bu, was reduced to 34% by I990,fora
total loss ofmore than halfofXSBN's forests.
There are ways to reduce the amount of fores, consumed as fuel in Yunnan, for
example:
The exploitation of fores, for export (including export to central government
agencies and other provinces) might be harder to trace and to counteract. A combi-
nation ofnew roads creating access to previously unexploited areas and economic
incentives to trade in valuable raw materials might destroy even more of the dwindling
old-growth forests.26
Another concern for XSBN's forests is found in the Simao Forestation and
Sustainable Wood Utilization Project, primarily funded by the ADB. Although the
project is designed around a "siviculturally-oriented forest management plan" and
reforestation project, it also includes the operation of a 51,000 ton capacity pulp-mill
at Simao, which is quite close to the second-largest operating port on the Lancang
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River, Xiaoganlanba.27 The mere proximity of the Simao pulp-mill to XSBN's forests,
(the distance from Xiaoganlanba Harbor to Yunjinghong Harbor being only 85 km),
ought to be somewhat alarming.28
Of course, wherever forests and rapidly developing transport networks occur
together there is some potential for degradation and loss of forest cover, but the
situation in XSBN is unusual. The historical isolation of XSBN, including the
political sensitivity of its border right up to the present day, has kept it out of the loop
of inland and coastal China, and off-limits to the economies of mainland Southeast
Asia. The move to open XSBN places it at a crucial position, both geographically and
temporally; transforms the region with pressures of the world market; and imposes a
new identity on the Dai people, who are imagined as a sort of cultural bridge to the
surrounding border populations and their nations.
Compare the situation in XSBN with the transformation of the Amazon region,
where:
"The frontier at the end of the twentieth century has new aspects. It is now
heterogenous, consisting of a superimposition of fronts involving various
activities...settlement and production are relatively modest. It is now urban at
the outset, involves a very rapid rate of urbanization, and the federal
government has a fundemental role in planning and in the volume of
investments in infrastructure. Thus the frontier is no longer the synonym of
free lands to be appropriated by pioneers. It is a social and political space, not
fully structured, and therefore a potential generator of new realities, which
makes it a strategic space for the state. "29
Similarly, for XSBN, we see a unique case of development in mainland China.
Where domestic markets and services have been protected, and where many local
markets are still housed in woven bamboo and grass salesrooms, we see a Thai oil
company building the largest department store. The image of commercial progress is
linked to the greater Tai sphere, (in former years political dynamite!), and the Chinese
government actively promotes a synthetic consciousness of Dai and Thai unity.
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This unprecedented experiment in reshaping the society ofXSBN
"autonotnous" prefecture, ts very much a case study ,„ generatmg a new reahty of the
frontier, and though there are scarifies in Xinjiang and its border trade with
Kazakhstan, the Chtnese central government has not promoted U.ghur identified
wrth their cultural and linguistic counterparts in ne.ghboring countries. In fact quite
the opposite is taking place as the central authorities, fearing disumty fa, Xinjiang, are
cracking down on expressions of unity between the Uighurs of Xinjiang and other
Uighur groups across the Chinese border in Central Asia. 30
E. Tourism and Opening XSBN
The largest growth industry in XSBN is tourism, based on the natural beauty of
the landscape and the cultural diversity of the local people. Tourism brings in not only
foreign exchange earnings, but also new ideas, new business opportunities, new styles,
and new lifestyles. While the Dai people ofXSBN have a reputation for carrying on
their own lifestyles, unihibited by visitors, the sheer number of arrivals and the
incentive of cashing in on the tourist trade will certainly affect their social forms,
creating new habits, new goals, and new expectations.
From 1956 to 1977, the average foreign tourist arrivals to the provincial capital,
Kunming, amounted to some 270 per year. With the reforms of 1 978, the number rose
to 1299 the first year, and by 1993 had skyrocketed to 286,000 visitors. During the
same period foreign exchange earnings rose from 83,000 yuan to 196 millionyuanM
In XSBN, foreign tourist arrivals in 1992 had reached 13,609, while domestic visitors
numbered 1.2 million.32 m 1995, the total number of visitor arrivals had risen to 1.54
million, of which 23,600 were foreigners.33 The visitors also generated US$ 7.3
million in foreign exchange revenues from 1991 to 1995.34
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The tourist boom in XSBN has fueled the infrastructure projects described
earlier, drawn foreign investor's interest, and even resulted in the installation of 23,600
program-controlled telephones and lines for pagers and cellular phones.35 The sleepy
rainforest is blooming into a sort of techno-resort on the northern edge of Southeast
Asia, with a tourist industry that can be expected to grow as fast, or even faster than
the capacity of hotels and guesthouses.
The many concerns being raised by the tourism investment boom sweeping the
GMS, such as building resorts in ecologically sensitive areas, the proliferation of golf
courses in southern Laos (which consume huge volumes of water and spread great
quantities of chemicals into the aquifer), the idea to build a laser light show at the
Angkor Wat ruins in Cambodia, and the sex tourism industry (estimated to make US$
20 billion a year in Thailand).. .should be of equal concern as XSBN is being promoted
as its northern nexus, and its characteristic scenery becomes a part of high-investment,
high-profit tourism schemes.36
With the Lancang (Mekong) being touted as an "Oriental Danube," it has also
become the focus of plans to promote tourism for the GMS. Representatives of the
GMS member countries met in Kunming in late 1994, and held a five day seminar on
tourism. The seminar members agreed on a five point plan:
"
1 ) Promoting the subregion as a tourism destination
2) Holding a subregional tourism forum
3) Training instructors in basic tourism skills
4) Training resource managers in conservation and tourism
5) Implementing a Mekong River Tourism planning study"37
In the Spring of 1995, the Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) formed a
Mekong Forum working committee in order to put the issue on the agenda at the
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Pacific Asia Tourism Association Mart of April 1996.38 At the GMS conference held
in Kunming, October 1 996, an idea for a North-South Tourism Corridor was agreed
upon in principle. Pradech Phayakvichen, Deputy General ofTAT, advocated the
liberalization of air routes from Thailand to China. Coming on the heels ofthe new
Bangkok-Jinghong route, opened in April 1996, this can only mean increased arrivals
to XSBN and other destinations in Yunnan.39
The international efforts to organize and promote tourism in XSBN are not
leading but following the region's explosive growth in tourism. Arrivals to Jinghong
Airport reached 240,000 in 1994, which means the majority of visitors, more than a
million per year, are still arriving overland. Pressure to increase the passenger volume
has spilled over from one sector to another, and has pushed the objectives for Lancang
River traffic higher and higher.
In 1 985, the total passenger volume on the Lancang River in XSBN was
reported to be 320,000 persons.40 The Xiaoganlanba Wharf in Simao, opened in
1 992, has a passenger capacity of 1 50,000 passengers a year. The Daganlanba Harbor
(some 30 km south of Jinghong Harbor in XSBN) had a capacity of 100,000
passengers a year. The Jinghong Harbor has a 2,000 square meter multi-purpose
service building, can land two to four ships at the same time, and has a capacity of
200,000 passengers a year. While the passenger volume on the river is still less than
half of the overland service, objectives based on the stipulations of the Eighth Five
Year Plan sought to increase the passenger capacity to 1.5 million per year in 1995, to
5.2 million per year in 2000, and to 1 8 million per year in 201 5.4 * Let us hope that
these objectives will not be met! Otherwise we will have a river that looks like the
average metropolitan highway.
At even a modest rate of growth, the increase of river traffic can be expected to
have a serious impact on the river ecology, on the river's shores, estuaries, and on the
traditional uses of the river.
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F. River Ecology
The burden of increased population in the river basin will pose new problems
with waste disposal. Increased use of mechanized shipping will raise the possibility of
oil discharges and spills, as well as accidents. Docks for cargo, access roads, and
warehouses, as well as new or enlarged passenger ferry ports with waiting areas and
parking lots will all pose pollution problems and might result in the destruction of
natural habitats.
In August 1996, ESCAP convened a meeting of marine transport experts to
examine the impacts of the Mekong basin development scheme. Under consideration
were criticisms aired by scientists who predicted the developments will:
"...endager rare marine species, decrease soil fertility, and threaten the delta
with a reduced flow of silt. Consequently the Bangkok discussions have led to
calls for the establishment of an international legal framework to regulate
navigation along the river to protect its environment ....Lack of regulation and
the absence of an adequate institutional frame-work for navigation on the river
hampers its development and creates acute risks of pollution. The
development of navigation facilities could encourage illegal logging and may
also lead to increased cross-frontier drug smuggling and clandestine labour
movement. (The experts) fear that the river's environment is threatened by a
sudden, substantial increase in human population, including mass tourism.
Soil erosion, a decline of soil fertility, and the dredging of reservoirs a likely to
follow intensive industrial development in a region still largely unspoilt."42
The problems contingent upon opening the river were spelled out at the
ESCAP meeting, but the widespread interest in reaping tourism profits, boosting
shipping capacity, and above all, generating electricity for power-hungry industries,
are pushing the entire program forward. In the meantime, we can expect the shipping
boom in XSBN to continue at full steam and the port at Jinghong Harbor to be busier
than ever. Although the Xiaoganlanba Wharf was booming in 1993, by the summer of
1996:
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"...it is on the way to being derelict now, because Jinghong Harbour has
captured most of the rapidly developing river trade."43
Therefore, the highest concentration of river traffic will center on the port at Jinghc
and the immediate vicinity in XSBN. Whatever changes are in store will directly
impact the Dai residents of the same area and their traditionally intimate use of the
river.
G. Use of the Lancang River in Dai Society.
1. Shipping
The continuing expansion of shipping traffic in XSBN will certainly interfere
or push out whatever small scale shipping and transport that still exists in Dai society.
That the Dai people did have their own practice of navigating the river is beyond
question. Take, for example, the following account of a trip on a hired boat, which
was written by Yao Hesheng during the 1940's:
"The Lancang is also an infamous river in Yunnan, not only because it's shores
are places full of malaria, but because the river itself is extremely treacherous.
The river's surface is very wide and its water is deep, but except for a few very
narrow sections, it is completely un-navigable. On the one hand it's true that
this is because the current is too swift, but the main reason is that there are
perilous rapids everywhere, some ofthem standing out of the water like giants,
and should a boat strike them, it will be immediately pounded to bits by their
cruel fists. Some boats are pulled below into the shadowy depths, and though
the water's surface looks placid, below the surface there is a fearsome vortex.
Once a boat comes to this place, it's as if a thousand water demons are rocking
the hull to capsize it, or else pulling it under, and there is simply no way to
resist.
Nonetheless it is still possible to navigate a small boat on the section
between Cheli and Ganlanba. Once I hired a small wooden boat to go to
Ganlanba. After breakfast, we boarded the boat, which was about four or five
feet wide and fifty to sixty feet long. It was very pointy on both ends like a
70
spindle. There wasn't a single metal fastener on the entire boat The planks
were woven together with bamboo strips and the gaps between them were not
caulked with lime and putty, so that water was bubbling up from the cracks
It was a disheartening sight. (See Fig. 23) On board were only three or four
of us travellers and foar boatmen. The boatmen had substantial builds and
were full of spit and vinegar, shouting and laughing for the whole journey.
It was just at the end of the dry season, the water level was especially
low, and the river surface was only half of its width during the rainy season.
Still, the current was swift, carrying a great quantity of silt, so that it seemed
just like the turbid Yellow River. The boatmen did not pole the craft, but just
sat astern talking and laughing, allowing the boat to follow the current by itself.
In a trice we had passed below the Prefect's market and could just barely
distinguish the Damian Temple and the Prefect's offices amidst the density of
green.
After passing out of town the river became narrower, with many rocks
and rapids scattered here and there. As the water struck the big rocks, it sent
up garlands of white spray and a fine mist that soaked our hair and faces.
Meanwhile, a sort of roaring sound filled our ears. Some of the biggest rocks
had names and had strange stories recounting their history. The biggest rock in
those parts was called "Bamalong" and was thrown all the way from Beijing by
a Chinese Emperor. What a pity these boatmen weren't sure about this story,
and I myself can't remember which dynasty's Emperor was so strong. There
were two or three really treacherous places that looked quite peaceful on the
surface. One could see but a few trails of leaves roiling from one side to the
other.
The passengers of another boat had given up on their journey, and their
boatmen tried to advise us to disembark, but we couldn't see anything to fear,
and unwilling to show weakness in front of the strangers, we resolutely refused
to stop. Nor were our own boatmen reluctant to go on, they twisted their boat
poles and marshalled all their strength. After a short time the boat was already
flying, as if slipping across the surface of the rapids. Then suddenly the whole
boat began to shake... it was shaking like mad and the spray drenched us from
head to toe, missing only one or two spots. Water was pouring into the boat
and it was quite a while before it gradually began to calm down.
My heart was jumping wildly around in my chest, as if it was going to
jump out of my mouth, but my face managed to maintain its composure and
held out straight through to our destination. Afterwards, I did feel a little
regret over taking such risk."44
Mr. Yao might have been over-dramatizing somewhat, but earlier accounts, such as
those of deCarne and Smythe, indicate that the river passage was much the same
during the mid to late nineteenth century.
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"At Chieng Hung the Me Kawng first becomes navigable to the natives.
Bamboo rafts are used for taking salt down as far as Chieng Lap, their crews
returning overland. It was here that deLagree's expedition finally left the
Mekong and struck north and eastward into China. Though they had been
obliged to leave their dug-outs at Muang Len or Tan Aw, Gamier returned to
the river again and again, as they advanced to Chieng Hung, to see if it were
practicable for boats, and always with the same result. For Tang Aw is the
highest point at which the people can force their boats against the current. "45
Modem motorized vessels have extended the range of navigation northward, at
least as far as Xiaoganlanba. Gradual improvements to the shipping channel,
including dredging and dynamiting of rapids, have opened up the Lancang to larger
and larger ships, and these practices are being extended southward to Chiang Khong,
Thailand, and Huay Xai, Laos. The reported international shipping volume has
already increased from 500 tons to 50,000 tons a year. With continuing efforts to blast
rapids and to develop shallow draft ships,46 the Lancang (Mekong) traffic can only
continue to surge over the next few years, and this will surely be complicated by the
local use of the river, as in the case of farmers who take the weekly passenger ferry
upriver to find work, then float back downstream on inner tubes.47 Under these
circumstances, the chances of accidents and collisions are enormous.
2. Bathing, Washing and Fishing
Although changes in river transport are potentially threatening, they only affect
a minority of the local population. On the other hand, the traditional Dai use of the
river for bathing, washing, and fishing poses a much more serious danger to the people
living along the Lancang and its feeder streams. According to the 19th century visitor,
Archibald Colquhoun:
"Some of the hamlets near the river-bank are exclusively inhabited by
fisherman; and every man, woman, and child, from October to June, is at work
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with net, rod, line, or the baskets which are worked at every wier, situated next
the fisher hamlets.
"
48
If Colquhoun's observations are correct, then fishing is a year-round activity,
stopping only for the heaviest rains and flood season. A more recent study (1960) of
village life in Northern Thailand found that villagers fished nearly every day, regard-
less of the weather, after the rice seelings had been transplanted into the paddy fields.
The villagers used weighted throw nets, bamboo dams, nets attached to bamboo poles,
spear fishing, traps, hook and line, dip nets and occasional damming of canals to fish-
methods strikingly similar to those described and illustrated by visitors to the Shan
states along the Mekong.49 Similar fishing methods are used by the Dai people in
Yunnan (See Fig. 26), and will expose them to potential hazards as the volume of
shipping increases on the Lancang (Mekong).
Even greater risks are involved when one considers characteristic Dai practice
of bathing in the river. In the early evening Dai women and children are seen relaxing
and bathing in the rivers and streams ofXSBN. (See Fig. 24) The Han Chinese have
found this practice to be unchaste and immodest, and yet have also created a whole
form of eroticism on the subject, so that no story of a trip to XSBN is complete
without some romanticised voyeurism thrown in. The sad fact for the average person
of Dai heritage is that it must be increasingly difficult to bathe, with a million tourists
creeping around in the underbrush all year long.
Even in years past, the bathing practice was never a sort of exhibitionism, as it
has often been portrayed. Yao Hesheng, visiting XSBN during the 1940's, described
the basic Dai bathing habits in this way:
"They don't bathe at home using hot water, they all run down into the rivers or
the streams to take a cold dip. While they are bathing, men, women, old and
young are all jumbled together in one place. Women bathing together with
men in the open air will naturally attract people's attention (how much more so
for the people of ceremonies, Han Chinese!) But of course, in front of men,
the women are not willing to show themselves naked. They have always first
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undressed in the shadows beneath the trees and put on tube skirts, first raising
them up to cover their breasts, then walking down into the water before
removing them. As they proceed to enter the river, they slowly pull their skirts
upwards with both hands as the water gets deeper. The skirts are gradually
drawn higher until the women are fully submerged in the water, and then the
skirts are slipped off over the tops of their heads. The women then fold up
their skirts into narrow strips and wrap them around their heads. Finally they
take a refreshing bath and sometimes the young women will go for a swim.
After bathing, their tube skirts are opened up again and unwrapped
from their heads to cover their bodies. As they walk toward the shore, they
gradually emerge from the water's surface while their tube skirts are gradually
lowered. By the time they have gotten out of the water, they are completely
'
clothed "50
From this account, it seems that Dai women have a chaste, graceful, and
delightful custom for bathing in the river. On the other hand, the same author also
relates the following experience:
"Once I saw a group of young women bathing, which was, simply speaking,
and exquisite picture. That was at a peaceful spot on the upper reaches of the
Liu Sha River. The water was so clear, even the pebbles on the bottom were
fairly visible, and both shores were crowded with lush tropical plants. The sun
was about to set and the sky was full of pink clouds, which were reflected in
the water...very beautiful. Suddenly a group of young women appeared at the
water's edge, and without noticing me among the trees on the other side, one by
one they removed every stitch of clothing, until they seemed like statues carved
out of marble. They walked back and forth in the water, a few ofthem swam
laps across the river, while others sat on top of a big rock in the water and sang
songs. Still others cried out 'sui sui,' or splashed themselves with water.
Occasionally, I caught a glimpse of their jade-smooth flesh, and other times I
only saw their gorgeous heads, with long hair spread out in disorder, floating
this way and that upon the water. I felt that they must be a bunch of Sirens or
Nymphs."5l
As picturesque as the scene may be, it is hard to imagine in combination with a
train of 200-ton barges and passenger boats buzzing along. Should the Dai people
continue to bathe in their customary way, they run not only the risk of collisions and
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fatal accidents, but long-term exposure to diesel fuel, oil, bilge water, and other
effluents.
Bathing and fishing aside, the Dai people are also dependent on the river and
its immediate estuaries for washing clothes and washing food. (See Fig. 25) In former
years, when XSBN enjoyed lower population densities and virtual isolation, this might
not have presented any serious risk, but with the growth river traffic the possibilities of
contamination will be sharply increased.
Unfortunately, there has been no mention of addressing these issues, even by
the panel of marine experts assembled by ESCAP. As for the GMS projects being
advanced, the Proposed Environmental Projects include a "Subregional Environmental
Monitoring and Information System," and support of Environmental NGO's, as well as
support for minimum regional environmental standards.52 While these initiatives
sound promising, they have yet to receive funding or to be established in practice, and
still the pace of shipping is advancing unabated. Under the circumstances, there is an
urgent need for field research, both to establish montoring points and data collection
agencies, and to identify the areas where the traditional use of the river by local
residents is in greatest peril from new sources of pollution.
H. Eco-tourism and Alternative Views on Development
Of the many sources examined in this study, several of their authors remained
skeptical about the benefits of opening and developing Yunnan. Five members of the
Environmental Research Center, have examined the cause and extent of environmental
degradation in Yunnan, and have amply demonstrated the province's vulnerability to
deforestation, erosion, and landslides. They point out that the high degree of slope in
many areas of Yunnan, and the encroachment of tough, invasive grasses, inhibits
forest renewal, and the combination of these conditions only aggravates the situation.
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The authors also clearly indicate the extent of pollution caused by industry and mining
operations in Yunnan, such as the 0.4 to 0.5 billion cubic meters of industrial waste-
water discharged every year. They estimated 150,000 hectares of land were being
irrigated with polluted water, resulting in high levels of toxic substances both in the
soil and in the crops. The severity of environmental damage being done in Yunnan,
led the authors to conclude:
"If, and only if the ecological environment in Yunnan is improved and the
ecological balance maintained can the advantages of the abundant natural
resources be exploited and can the economy steadily grow. The approach of
"mining" natural resources and developing industry and mining by severely
polluting the environment results in disaster, not wealth for the people of
*
Yunnan."53
Although the members of the Environmental Research Center made the
severity of the situation clear in their 1990 article, the situation worsened to such an
extent that the famous lake Dianchi was being contaminated with 200 million tons of
raw sewage every year.54 With ongoing construction ofnew roads and new rural
industry, there is every indication that Yunnan is heading for an environmental
disaster. How can the disaster be avoided? How can the ecological balance be
restored?
One author, Yang Fuquan, of the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, stands
out as the leading advocate of an alternative to develop-ment as directed by industrial
and market forces. Yang sees tourism as a driving force for revenue and a source of
foreign exchange. As more and more areas in Yunnan have been opened to tourism,
revenues have soared. Yang sees the greatest potential in using eco-tourism as a
means for both economic development and conservation of the environment. Not only
will the rapid expansion of eco-tourism serve to preserve the still unspoiled parts of
the province, but it fosters a renewable resource~a beautiful landscape.
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Yang's advocacy of eco-tourism is especially relevant to the opening of the
Lancang (Mekong) corridor. He painstakingly describes the existing biodiversity of
Yunnan, including the rainforests of XSBN, and the degree to which it is already being
destroyed. He points out the obvious advantages that such environments have for
various eco-tourism activities: forest tours, river trekking, and tours that integrate
research and surveying of physical georaphy, botany, wildlife, and anthropology.
Equal attention is given to the preservation of cultural diversity and ethnic tradition in
Yang's eco-tourism plan, which he says is necessary before it is too late.
"We can no longer delude ourselves with the fame of bygone days by saying:
'Yunnan has a rich, diverse culture.' After a long period of historical
transformation, all the ethnic groups of Yunnan have experienced profound
change in lifestyles and culture. Because we didn't attach enough importance
to the minorities' traditional cultures in the past, those aspects which are the
most characteristic and endearing to tourists are now vanishing and
changing."55
Yang's assessment of the changes in the local cultures of Yunnan are frank and
unflinching, as are his criticisms of commercializing watered down versions of
"traditional culture" for mass-consumption, which he calls a form of "vulgarization."
On the other hand, Yang also offers an interesting suggestion about adopting folk
tradition as a way of strengthening ecological awareness. He cites the sacred
mountains of the Tibetans, where chopping trees or polluting were strictly taboo.
Similarly, the sacred mountains and sacred trees of the Dai people, a subject rarely
studied, if at all, could provide the foundation for an ecological awareness program.56
The great Lancang River, and the thousands of kilometers of the Mekong, also
have their share of gods and spirits in the traditions of the Dai and Thai people. In the
festival known as loy gating, which takes place on the full moon of the 12th month,
the people:
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"...set afloat elaborate little boats made of banana leaf, each with incense sticks,
flowers, and a lighted candle. One popular belief is that this asks pardon for
the bad done to the waters by washing and even worse use of the rivers and
canals."57
Will these small offerings, bobbing and flickering on the moonlit water be
scattered in the wake of powerboats and barges, or is there some way to take
advantage of the attractiveness of the original cultures that still survive in the
rainforests of the upper Mekong?
The question is perhaps best answered in the caveat of Yang Fuquan:
"If one day it dawns on us that all of our resources have been wasted, then our
tourism industry will turn into a tree without any roots. We can no longer be
blind or complacent toward Yunnan's present ecological situation...we must
look instead at the various crises hidden within development."58
In short, the opening of the Lancang River will bring several crises to the Dai
people of Xishuangbanna: (1) the incidence of water pollution will impact them
severely unless they suddenly abandon their traditional uses ofthe river; (2) their new
position at the center of a major international crossroads will introduce overwhelming
transformative pressures on the local economy, demography, politics and social norms;
(3) the general lack of education, skilled labor, and investment capital will place
serious limitations on the ability of the Dai people to adapt to their new circumstances.
Although we are unable to examine the extent to which these problems have
already matured, the picture we have been able to delineate from various sources
suggests some vital areas for further research. A survey of the number of people
bathing and washing food in the river and immediate estuaries should be taken, and
the resulting population estimates and locations should be mapped. Alternative means
of bathing and washing, and a reliable warning system should be developed and
introduced immediately to prevent a catastrophic public health emergency in the case
of a shipping accident. An independent assessment of goods being transported should
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be undertaken, with special attention to transport, packaging, and handling of toxic
and dangerous substances.59 Monitoring stations should be set up for continuous
readings of the river's basic data, especially at points of confluence with inlets, and at
points accessible enough to take regular sediment and water samples.
How the opening of the Lancang (Mekong) corridor will impact the culture,
economy and society ofXSBN remains to be seen. The local economy will see the
most immediate and the most serious impacts of internationalization. New businesses
and industries will attract laborers, causing, on the one hand, relocation problems and
increased urbanization, and on the other hand a depletion of the rural labor force. The
development of surface and water transport will offer greater mobility for temporary,
seasonal, and even permanent employment, as well as open up previously inaccessible
areas to resource exploitation. The long term effects of population movements will
force changes in rural modes of production, and once removed from their traditional
livelihoods, the culture of the Dai people, as well as other local cultures, will be under
even greater pressure to adapt to new conditions.
In an area that was never completely acculturated to the Han Chinese way of
life, the Dai people are now being encouraged to make use of their Dai 'roots' to open
up border trade. Will they be more influenced by the culture of Thailand, or by the
influence of more generalized forms of modernization via Thailand? For example, if
the Dai are attracted to Thai language television broadcasts, they might recieve a
bigger dose of Western-influenced commercial culture than cultural forms that are
traditionally Thai. In this way, the Dai people might find themselves absorbing the
customs, styles, and even language of the global media culture, with it's arbiters in
distant Hollywood and New York, rather than adapting to the cultural mores of
Bangkok or Beijing.
More immediately, the Dai people will be responding to their contacts with
affluent neighbors in Thailand. The Lancang (Mekong) open navigation agreement
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will allow Dai - Thai relations to grow, regardless of the political situation in
Myanmar. Even so, the push to open new surface roads through the eastern Shan
States, such as the road south from Damenglong to Mong Yawng, Mong Hpayak,
Tachilek and Mae Sai, might also inspire a new regional Dai identity. The relations
between XSBN Dai and the Shan peoples of Myanmar, as well as the Dai Lue of
Northern Thailand and Laos may be rekindled as the area is united by year-round
transport for the first time in history. How the Chinese administrations in Yunnan
and Beijing would respond to the emergence of a regional Dai society is quite another
subject of speculation, but being almost powerless themselves, the Dai people are
going to remain subject to greater geopolitical forces, just as they are caught in the
center of the Lancang (Mekong) corridor and all of the interests that seek to develop
their homeland as the last great frontier in Asia.
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China - Myanmar Trade (in USS millions)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
(Statistics from Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995.)
Figure 1. China - Myanmar Trade
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Combined Imports and Exports (in US $ millions)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
(Statistics from Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995.)
Figure 2. China Trade With GMS Countries
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Figure 4. China - Thailand Trade
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(Source: Rock, 1947: plate 174.)
Figure 5. Kawagarbo Mountain Towers Over
the Upper Lancang
85
(from Rock, 1947: plate 200)
Figure 6. Cliffs Along the Upper Lancang
Its Tributary Streams
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(from China Pictorial 2 (1990): 14)
Figure 7. The Lancang Valley South of Yongping
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Length of Lancang / Mekong River
in Tibet
20%
53%
in SE Asia Bin XSBN El in Yunnan Bin Tibet
Total Length: 4661 km
In Southeast Asia: 2500 km
In China: 2161 km
In Yunnan (w/o XSBN) 1059 km
In Tibet and Qinghai 914 km
In Xishuangbanna 188 km
Total Drainage Area: 630,000 km2
In China: 161,000 km2
In Yunnan: 91,000 km2
(Data from Liu, 1991: 506; Peng, 1995b: 21; Li, 1991: 498; Lin, 1991: 421.)
Figure 9. Length and Drainage of Lancang / Mekong
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(from Rock, 1947: plate 143)
Figure 10. Goatskin Rafts For Crossing the Yangzi
In Northern Yunnan
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(from Zhongguo shaosku minzu, 1987: 435)
Figure 11. Woven Bridge Over the Dulong River
In Yunnan
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(top: from Rock, 1947: plate 174; bottom: Kaulbeck, 1938: 257)
Figure 14. Horses Being Slung Across the Mekong
& Salween Rivers
(from Bai, 1994: 4)
Figure 15. Iron Bridge Across the Yangpi River
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(top: from Xu, 1990: 34; bottom: from Ding and Sun, 1995
Figure 16. Ship Service at Guanlei, XSBN
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(from EIU Country Profile: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, 1995-6: 84)
Figure 17. Myanmar Inland Water Freight Volume
and Containers Handled
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Figure 18. Hydropower Stations on the Lancang River,
Existing and Proposed Development
Continued Next Page
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Figure 18. Continued
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(from China Today, Jan 1995: 53)
Figure 19. Manwan Hydropower Station
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Yunnan Forward Position Border Processing Bases
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(motions)
(top: adapted from Peng, 1995: 25; bottom: compiled from FEA, 1996)
Figure 21. Yunnan Forward Position Border Processing
Bases and Mekong Subregion Urban Populations
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(from Sun, 1982:357)
Figure 22. Traditional Dai Architecture
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(from Audemard, 1971: 57)
Figure 23. Traditional Mekong Rafts
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(from Sun, 1982: 356)
Figure 24. Bathing in the Lancang River
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(from China Pictorial 5 (1988): 42)
Figure 26. Huayao Dai Women Dragging For Fish
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AIMM-NDIX
"ECO-TOURISM AND THE PROTECTION OF
YUNNAN'S TOURISM RESOURCES"
by Yang Fuquan
Translated by Merrick Lex Berman
( )riginally appeared in Yunnan shehui kcxuc
| Yunnan Social Science] 1 995( 1 ): 52-58.
Paragraphs are numbered according to page and line numbers in original Chinese text
(i.e. 52.1 =page 52, line 1).
52.
1
Yunnan, located at the forefront of the Chinese region opening up to Southeast
Asia and South Asia, is one of the world's fairly large areas with such a pleasant
climate. For some 300 days of each year, most places in the province have tempera-
tures between 10° - 30° C, so it has always been fondly said that Yunnan has "four
seasons of Spring." Yunnan's unique and spectacular natural ecology and human
environment form a rich resource for tourism. The province has six national scenic
districts; ten provincial scenic districts; the so-called "first wonder of the world," the
Stone Forest; and the renowned "first great gorge of the world," the Tiger Leaping
Gorge. Among Yunnan's famous mountains and rivers there are the Yulong Shan, the
Meilixue Shan, the Jinsha River, the Lancang River, and others; as well as several
dozen beautiful high plains lakes such as Dianchi Lake, Lugu Lake, Fuxian Lake, and
Erh Hai. Yunnan has also been called an animal kingdom, a plant kingdom, and a
treasure house of ethnic cultures. China has fifty-six ethnic groups, twenty-five of
which are distributed throughout Yunnan, the highest share of any single province in
the entire nation.
52.8 Yunnan society's rich diversity in human environment and in natural eco-
environment augment one another, they attract increasing numbers of foreign tourists,
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and in recent years Yunnan's tourism industry has continued to develop unabated. By
1992, the income generated by the tourism industry of Yunnan had entered the ranks
of the top ten among Chinese provinces. When the Yunnan provincial government set
up the province-wide development plan, the decision to establish Yunnan as a major
tourism destination was promulgated.
52.11 A tourism industry that continues to grow day after day promotes Yunnan's
economic development, improves the livelihood of the various peoples living in the
tourism districts, and increases the recognition value for Yunnan both in China and
abroad. For this reason, promoting Yunnan's tourism industry is an important matter
for the natural economy and the people's livelihood. As the industry flourishes,
protecting its fundamental points of durability will depend upon how much priority is
given to long-term protection of Yunnan's tourism resources, by conserving and
enhancing their lure and fascination. As stated above, the power of Yunnan's tourism
industry lies in its spectacular natural beauty and its human environment, therefore I
believe that the vigorous development of eco-tourism is the most important factor in
promoting our province's growing tourism industry and safeguarding its strength for
the long-term.
ONE
52. 1 6 One of the greatest challenges demanding the world's attention today is the
very survival of the human race, which must rely on the improvement and protection
of the eco-environment. Without a decent natural environment, humankind will face
crisis on all sides. The concept and form of travel called "eco-tourism," although
created within the international context of ecological problems demanding our
attention, is (as the name suggests) a tourism movement that is closely integrated with
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the protection of the eco-environment. This kind of tourism, for a place that is mainly
dependent on the strength of its natural environment to build up tourism, such as
Yunnan, has all the more vital significance.
52.20 In Western countries, eco-tourism, is a sort of tourism that has been developed
for some time already. The appearance of the standard name eco-tourism took place at
the First International Environmental Protection Conference, held in Mexico in 1986.
After this concept appeared, it had an immediate catalytic effect in many countries
around the world. All sort of organizations such as Greenpeace, travel groups,
research institutes, etc., adopted various means of promoting and organizing eco-
tourism, and at the same time many universities created courses and opened research
centers related to eco-tourism. As more and more people became practitioners and
organizers of "eco-tourism," international academic conferences on the subject also
multiplied.
53.5 Put simply, eco-tourism is a form of tourism with a primary purpose of
protecting the eco-environment of tourist areas. Relying on the traveler's actions, the
local government, and the local residents, the organized work of eco-tourism combines
their efforts so that they form into a single purpose. It strongly emphasizes closely
coordinating the tourists with the local residents of tourist areas; and only under the
precondition of a unified effort to protect the local natural and human environments
would tourism be developed. It would not take up any artificial means of spoiling the
natural characteristics of the district, such as blindly building up the district with big
restaurants, amusement parks, tourist buses, and so on, which are unsuitable for the
local environment and culture.
53.9 From the very start, those advancing local tourism must produce a detailed
plan and also produce results which will fully protect the local tourism resources
according to the local conditions. The tourists, in the process of traveling, must
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contribute their share by acting in the dual role of admirers and protectors, and not
merely as consumers from far away places. Travelers should both visit scenic spots
and at the same time learn something from the local culture. They should be familiar
with, and respectful of, local customs. (By way of example,) the author, when
attending a lecture at the Eco-tourism Research Institute of Canada's Simon Frazier
University, saw photographs of sea-turtles laying their eggs under cover of darkness.
They were undisturbed by the (conscientious) eco-tourists taking their picture.
53.15 Since eco-tourism includes both protection of natural and human environments,
a crucial point in building the eco-tourism industry is how the tourists and local
residents can cooperate in the preservation and enhancement of tourism resources,
making them attractive to others over the long-term. In the "Manila Declaration,"
presented at the World Tourism Conference (Manila, Sep. 1980), it was emphasized
that: "The basic strength to attract tourists lies in the resources ofNature." The most
popular slogan in the international tourism industry today is "back to nature;" and this
makes it clear that preservation of a fine eco-environment is a vital foundation for any
expanding tourism industry.
53.20 Looking at the present state of affairs in Yunnan, it's clear that the big push to
publicize and develop tourism is already a matter of great urgency because Yunnan's
tourism resources are already in a grave situation, facing a crisis of degradation that
cannot be viewed with much optimism.
53.21 In terms of the natural environment, Yunnan can open up forest tours;
mountain and river trekking; tours that integrate research and surveying of physical
geography, botany, wildlife, and blossom viewing...all of these being important
elements of eco-tourism. But currently in many places throughout Yunnan the
environment has already been seriously depleted, imperiling our aspirations to make
Yunnan a major destination for tourism. During the period since the 1950's, a series
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of policy mistakes (which flew in the face of common sense) were made. For example
"Everyone Struggle to Produce Iron"! during the Great Leap Forward period;2
"Organize Dining Commons'* in the early communization period; "Reclaim Land to
Make Fields'^ during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolut,on;5 and also long
periods of excessive logging, clearing forests and grasslands, all of which have very
critically damaged Yunnan's ecological balance.
53.27 Since the reforms (of the 1980's), the system of industrial production has
expanded rapidly, bringing visible economic benefits to our province, while at the
same time creating discharges of the "three wastes,"6 which have been causing serious
pollution of our air, soil, and waters. The first problem to crop up in Yunnan was the
acute tendency for pollution of rivers and lakes near cities, and the gradual worsening
of air quality in cities and some townships. Then, with the speeding up of rural
industrial development, environmental pollution spilled over into our rural villages.
Since then, consequently, large areas of Yunnan's tourism resources seem fated to
pollution and degradation.
53.3 1 Take Kunming, for example. A famous city even outside of China, with a
national-level tourist area built upon the bank of Dianchi Lake.. .but in recent years this
city, which is the hub of Yunnan tourism, has been suffering air and water pollution
that worsens every day. The once beautiful Dianchi Lake has practically become a
municipal garbage dump,7 which has negatively impacted the character of Kunming as
a superb place to travel. Other famous mountains and waters are in the same
predicament, having been injured and scarred time and again by eco-degradation.
53.34 According to studies conducted by the Yunnan Environmental Science
Institute, the area in Yunnan where the least destruction of the ecology has occurred is
in the northwest, the zone around Deqen Prefecture and Lijiang. 8 These district's
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resources are both rich and vitally important as tourism areas, and yet even in these
d-stricts environmental degradation has been unceasingly on the rise. For example, De
qen, is situated in the famous scenic area of "Three Rivers Convergence" - (The
JiMha, Lancang, and Nujiang Rivers, based on a proposal by UNESCO, was approved
and designated as the "Three Rivers Convergence" district by China's State Council in
1988.) - and Deqcn has nevertheless in recent years been the scene of forest clear-
cutting and severe soil erosion, resulting in a number of landslides.
53.38 In Yunnan's major tourist spot, Xishuangbanna. the total area of forest cover
dropped from 50% in the 1950's to 30% in the 1970'S, the eco-systems of the mountain
areas have degenerated, and the number of endangered plant and animal species have
increased. During the past 40 years, several hundred species of plants and animals
have vanished from this region, and those now endangered comprise more thai I 5°/,, of
the total. Since the time of liberation, when the area of tropical rain forest stood at
1 740 wan mu, it has been reduced to 777 wan mu in 1 982, a loss of 55%, The area of
forest cover in yet another important tourist area, Lijiang, has dropped from 63% in
1947 to 37.8% in 1985. The ecological degradation o l forest species in the famous
tourist spots of Dal i and Dehong is also very pronounced.
54. 5 Rare plants and animals, high plains grassland and lakes, are all vital resources
for carrying out cco-tounsm; vet the crisis lacing these very resources in Yunnan is a
major problem threatening both the tourism industry and the livelihood ol the people,
for example, in I Vq<-n there are thirty-one plant species presently known to be
national important protected species, which comprise 7.9% of the national total of
protected species, and 20% of Yunnan's total, l ikewise some forty-eight animal
species are protected, 25.1% of the national total, and 4 ( >.5% of Yunnan's total
Nonetheless, many years of wanton trapping, killing, cutting and digging have reduced
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Deqen's plants and animals to a sorry state indeed, and some species are on the brink
of dying out.
54.9 Another example is the so-called Shen Hu [Spirit Lake], Na Pa Hai, in
Zhongdian County. Owing to the blind reclamation of farmland in the past, the forests
in the mountains surrounding the lake were nearly wiped out, the surface area of the
lake shrank, and the lake's depth became shallow. One priority protected species,
(used as an example of an extremely endangered species by the United Nations,) is the
Black-necked Crane, which winters in Na Pa Hai. Originally there were several
hundred pairs remaining, but these have dwindled to only twenty or thirty pairs. The
forests encircling Yong Ding's Lugu Lake are also severely depleted, greatly affecting
the entire lake's charm.
54. 1 3 In the early 1 950's, Yu zhujing tian, the famous scenic area in Lijiang, was
still a place of ancient artifacts, and dense forests where wild animals appeared and
vanished. But owing to many years of wild and excessive cutting, it's forests today are
bare, its temples wrecked, and visitors few. Significant damage has been done by the
same actions in Lijiang's national nature conservation area, the Yulong Mountains, so
that little of the original forest has been preserved. On the Yulong's mid-range and
lower slopes, the plants and animals are fewer every year.
54. 1 6 Formerly Lijiang was the home of a number of species of pheasant, one of
which, called by Western scholars Lijiang Pheasant (Lijiangnensis Crossoptilon), is
presently one of the rarest species of pheasant in the world...(according to Prof. Ives,
chairman of the International Mountain Association.) Prof. Ives, with the support of
the International Pheasant Research Association, conducted a field study of the
condition of the Lijiang Pheasant and considered Lijiang as an ideal place for tourists
to appreciate bird watching.
54. 1 9 But to be honest, because of the reductions in forests, on top ofwhich are
repeated cases of unbearable trapping, Lijiang's current number of pheasant species is
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much lower than before. Even today in Lijiang's towns and villages there are many
people who take hunting dogs and raptors to seize and kill pheasants. If serious
measures are not taken to stop them, then before long this precious natural resource
will vanish.
54.22 Erh Hai Lake is a part of Yunnan's most treasured landscape in the Dali
tourism district, but in recent years nearby factories have been dumping more than
1 0,000 tons of waste water per day into the lake; with effluents including: mercury,
arsenic, cyanide, phenol and other waste residues.
54.23 China's second deepest lake, Fuxian Hu, has suffered critical deforestation in
its surrounding aquifer. According to statistical records for 1975, the forest cover
amounted to only 7.8%, and the broken ecological balance has caused the water level
to drop. In many important tourism areas of Yunnan, we are seeing the water level of
lakes falling, their surface area shrinking, and their sources drying up, all of which
pose a great threat to these rich resources.
54.27 Because of this, ifwe want to establish Yunnan as a major tourism destination,
maintaining superb and sustainable tourism resources, then we must begin by im-
proving our eco-environment and we must start this by preserving what we have. If
one day it dawns on us that all of our resources have been wasted, then out tourism
industry will turn into a tree without any roots. We can no longer be blind or com-
placent toward Yunnan's present ecological situation and the continued development
of the tourism industry. We must look instead at the various crises hidden within
development.
54.30 Sustainable development of the tourism industry depends on the tacit
cooperation of tourists and the local community; as for protecting good tourism
resources and improving the eco-environment, the tourist area's local government and
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residents must make a concerted effort too. The message of the Globe '90
International Conference on Sustainable Tourism (held in Canada) was expressed in
five ways, of which the first point was: promote people's understanding of the
environmental and economic effects of tourism, and strengthen their ecological
awareness. The fifth point was: protecting the future development of tourism depends
on the quality of the existing environment. The purpose of eco-tourism is to promote
the improvement of tourist areas' eco-environment by means of close cooperation
between travelers, local government, and residents.
54.35 In Yunnan today, we must create and ecological awareness, especially in
improving tourist spots, and we must take up relevant measures to accomplish this.
The People's Government of Yunnan Province has already enacted some rules for
conserving the environment of tourist and vacation areas, for instance the
"Environmental Protection Regulations for Yangzong Lake, Yunnan" and others; and
it has promulgated the "Environmental Protection Objectives and Mission for the
Current Plan (1993-98) of the Yunnan Provincial Government." The Provincial
People's Congress also passed the "Yunnan Province Environmental Protection
Ordinances." In developing Yunnan's tourism industry we must use every effort to
protect our tourism resources and eco-tourism movement by fully implementing these
regulations and enhancing our eco-environment.
TWO
55.2 In human ecology studies we consider human beings and other living things as
existing together in a specific natural environment, and we consider human society
and culture as the pattern of all humankind in its struggle to adapt to the environment.
Whether man to man, or man within the environment, these relationships mutually
affect the formation of culture and cause cultural change. Another aspect emphasized
by eco-tourism is the culture that is created by human beings within the physical
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environment ofNature, and this can also be called "human cultural ecology." Human
cultural ecology is another important resource to rely on in developing the tourism
industry, complementing, as it does, the ecology of nature.
55.5 According to studies conducted over the last several years by the National
Tourism Bureau, and to the responses of foreign travelers, foreign visitors are more
interested in the customs and conditions of Chinese society than in scenic areas or
famous historical sites. Yunnan's greatest strength in cultural resources lies in the
diverse, colorful, and spirited folk customs created by twenty-five ethnic groups.
These ancient ethnic cultures form Yunnan's special allure to tourists and provide a
splendid foundation to develop Yunnan into a major tourist destination. The recent
vigorous growth of Yunnan's tourism, in addition to relying on superb landscapes, was
also motivated by our interesting cultures. Ifwe lacked such interesting cultures,
Yunnan's tourism industry could not by built up, and it wouldn't even be worth
discussing the establishment of a major tourist destination. What we must then realize
is that Yunnan's ethnic traditions are really in dire straits and on the verge of total
collapse.
55.12 We can no longer delude ourselves with the fame of bygone days by saying:
'Yunnan has a rich, diverse culture.' After a long period of historical transformation,
all the ethnic groups of Yunnan have experienced profound change in lifestyles and
culture. Because we didn't attach enough importance to the minorities' traditional
cultures in the past, those aspects which are the most characteristic and endearing to
tourists are now vanishing and changing.
55. 14 For example, there is the famous Naxi Dongba culture, which has brought
many scholars and visitors from China and abroad to come sample the charms of
Lijiang, and has even drawn some tourism investors.. .it was actually due to this
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singular human cultural ecology that they came. Sadly, this important cultural heritage
and cultural resource of Lijiang is in a state of crisis and on the verge of being lost.
55. 1 7 Of those elderly Dongba who fully understand Dongba texts and ancient
customs, there are hardly more than a few remaining; and the young people studying
the traditional culture and wisdom from the older Dongba are very few indeed. As for
Dongba religion, which formed a major element of Naxi customs, it is already
extremely rare among the people. If we don't take immediate measures to save it and
revitalize it, then after a few years, with only a few old books and artifacts left in the
Naxi district, lacking both a living Dongba culture and anyone to carry it on, a great
cultural resource (which has a bearing on the growth and decline of tourism) will be
lost forever.
55.21 The situation of the Dongba culture, on the verge of collapse, is very common
for all of the traditional ethnic cultures in Yunnan. In many places, traditional
mountain songs, ditties, dances and such are vanishing and not being handed down to
the next generation. Folk artists familiar with traditional ethnic art forms are fewer
every day. As a result, many ethnic youths no longer understand traditional art forms,
song duets, or singing contests, and those who participate are mostly their elders. As
for some of our ethnic groups in important tourist districts, the younger people are
crazy about singing karaoke and dancing in the latest trendy, informal dances, but
when it comes to their own ethnic songs and dances they couldn't care less, and on
average they appear to be completely ignorant of their own traditional culture.
55.27 Traditional ethnic costume, which is a part of traditional customs that always
fascinates tourists, is also currently in a state of crisis. In many minority districts, that
many young people are unwilling to wear traditional clothing is self-evident. Take for
example the ancient town of Lijiang, one might spend year after year there, but on
holidays it would be difficult to bump into a Naxi youth wearing traditional ethnic
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clothes. As a result, many tourists mistake Bai youths wearing traditional clothes for
Naxi youths. The Yeche people of Lang Di and other villages in Hong He County
originally had very distinctive style of dress,9 but now they've already been called
"bad habits" and abolished. Also, the singular women's clothing and accessories of the
Ximeng Wa people are now slowly vanishing. On a recent visit to the fairly conser-
vative Ximeng Wa Autonomous County village, Yue Song, the author saw that many
women had switched to Han Chinese dress. Except for New Year of other festivities,
the Jinuo people of Jinghong usually wear the latest fashion in Han or Western clothes.
Looking at the current trends in Yunnan, if we don't take action with some suitable
measures for improvement, and energetically promote them, many of our ethnic
costumes will become Sinified or Westernized, and we'll be losing an important ethnic
taste.
55.36 In addition to the decline of traditional ethnic clothing customs, traditional
ethnic architecture has gone through great changes. Minority groups are now
universally substituting Han style wood/brick or rebar/cement construction techniques
for their own traditional architecture in the hinterlands. Already the original
architecture styles of the local people are gradually disappearing.
56.3 Folk customs are an important resource for the tourism industry, but now our
most colorful traditional holidays and customs are also on the decline. For example,
the biggest holiday of Lijiang's Naxi ethnic group, theji r/a«, 10 has by now basically
disappeared. Also the Naxi ethnic festival, san duo,^ 1 held on the 8th of the 2nd lunar
month, is a spectacle which many visitors to Lijiang hope to see being celebrated
while among the Naxi people; but sadly enough, in most places the san duo rituals are
gone forever. Likewise the characteristic festivals among the Jinuo people for raising
a new house, for passing the new year, and for youths coming of age, are quickly
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fading away. As for the many Yunnan ethnic folkways portrayed on television and in
films, nowadays, most ofthem are organized re-enactments by people on location,
they are not really living folkways still preserved by the ethnic groups.
56.10 Each of our ethnic group's most characteristic traditional cultures and customs
are daily on the decline. Therefore with an ambition to make Yunnan a major tourist
destination, we are forced to deal with a crisis in sustaining our culture as a resource
for tourism. Ifwe don't take proper measures and promote them with heroic efforts,
then all of our colorful ethnic traditions and the very unique qualities of Yunnan's
culture will very shortly become a thing of the past.
56.12 Ifwe can universally launch eco-tourism in Yunnan, with the aim of protecting
the natural and cultural landscape, then we will make a great contribution to sustaining
the conservation of Yunnan's superior tourism resources. Experience gained in
various places around the world has shown that a healthy growth in the tourism in-
dustry both boosts the local economy and can be of great use in the recovery and
preservation of local traditional cultures. The heart of the matter lies with the tourism
district policy-makers and with the leaders of the local people, who must rely on the
eco-environment to develop tourism...they must also be conscious of protecting
natural and human ecology as a way to protect their tourism resources. They must not
see only the appearance of tourism flourishing before their eyes, while neglecting a
huge catastrophe hidden beneath the surface.
THREE
56.20 Of all the things we can use to promote eco-tourism, their primary motive is to
alleviate and put a stop to any negative influences that the tourism industry might have
upon the local natural environment and human ecology. This is because the goal of
eco-tourism is to protect the natural and human environment by means of tourist
activity.
125
Although, as everyone knows, eco-tourism has been called a "smokeless
industry," with positive benefits for advancing the local economy and cultural ex-
change, it can also produce some harmful effects in the tourist district, such as impacts
on the area's eco-environment by the tourists. At many scenic spots in Yunnan,
tourists are the outstanding producers of environmental pollution. Take, lor example,
Yunshaping, at the Yulong Mountain Nature Conservation District in Lijiang, which is
a famous scenic spot...many domestic tourists have been littering the roads and scenic
district with all sorts of garbage, beverage containers, plastic bags, and scraps of paper,
without a care in the world; and they are not only seriously polluting the scenery, but
also directly endangering the local villagers' livestock and livelihood. In the local
hamlets of the Yi people, many cows and goats have died by swallowing plastic bags
containing bits of food thrown away by tourists. Similarly, after Zhongdian County
was opened and saw a subsequent increase in tourists, the Bita Hai, Napa I lai, and
other famous scenic lake areas all experienced the same phenomenon of tourist's
littering and negligently tossing their garbage everywhere. The tourist litter at
Yongding's Lugu Lake and Lunan's Changhu Lake is quite evident.
56.29 Studies of this subject have shown that the majority of those responsible for
this pollution arc domestic tourists. Foreign tourists are comparatively self-conscious
in this respect, they place their rubbish into a small bag and carry it away from the area
back to a suitable place to dispose of it. This reveals the problem of a real gap
between the levels of traveler's cultural upbringing and civic awareness. Because ol
this gap, we not only must work on the long-term promotion of national moral
upbringing, but we must also redouble our efforts to manage tourist districts, to
establish and correct our regulations for managing tourist areas, and to make this a
strong action in the opening of eco-tourism.
56.34 Another negative influence upon the environment caused by the tourism
industry is the pilf ering of ecological resources. This phenomenon has appeared in
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recent years, involving both domestic and foreign travelers who use tourism as a
pretext to steal ecological rarities. For example, between 1988 and 1991, at Lijiang's
Yulong Mountain Nature Conservation District, there were seven incidents of tourists
being apprehended for taking rare butterflies, insects, and seed plants. Masquerading
as tourists, these thieves of local resources came from Japan, Australia, Eastern
Europe, and other places. Some ofthem were caught when they went to the nature
conservation areas, while some were caught while trying to hire local residents to act
as guides or while trying to hire peasants to go and collect the specimens. The damage
caused by people posing as tourists in order to steal plants and animal species is
significant, especially because by using money to entice local people to collect these
plants and animals they have cause no end of troubles. If this continues to spread, then
it will encourage the local people to wreck their local resources without regret in
pursuit of profit, and an atmosphere of selling off of resources will endanger the entire
eco-environment.
57.4 In addition, following the development of tourism the phenomenon of people
coming as tourists and illegally collecting and purchasing cultural artifacts is always
increasing. According to my own observations, even in Lijiang a number of precious
Dongba cultural artifacts have fallen into the hands of travelers from unknown places
of origin. Therefore, another important item in the work to protect Yunnan's cultural
resources is to prohibit the loss of our ethnic cultural artifacts.
57.7 Eco-tourism is useful for stimulating the recovery of local traditional cultures,
for spurring social development, and for strengthening our awareness of opening up to
the rest of the world, but it can also have harmful effects on our human eco-
environment. For example, the many different cultural concepts and lifestyles that
foreign and domestic tourists bring with them are an invasion of the local culture,
aggravating the conflicts between local and outside cultures.
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57.9 In reference to the sustainable development of tourism, the Three Principles' of
the Manila Declaration, (passed by the Manila World Tourism Conference, Sep.
1 980), suggested this specific measure: to educate the foreign and domestic tourists to
"safeguard, protect, and respect their tourist district resources, cultures, and human
relations." Eco-tourism is rooted in this sort of objective, to improve the local natural
and human eco-environments, therefore the energetic development of eco-tourism in
Yunnan will aid in the preservation of our tourist resources.
57.14 The commercialization of local ethnic cultures in places where tourism is
facilitated can also lead to its vulgarization. This appears in the form of fake, inferior
quality goods being passed off, which also has a long-term effect on the opening up
and reputation of cultural resources for tourism. Since the Naxi Dongba culture is
famed for having the "world's only living pictographic writing system," and a "unique
socio-cultural history," many tourists really like to buy contemporary Dongba
paintings by Dongba and Naxi artists. Due to this demand, a lot of roughly executed
fake artworks have appeared on the market, which in turn effect the reputation of
Dongba culture. In order for the people's traditional cultures to receive the greater
benefit from the economy and to sustain their power of attraction over tourists, these
types of cultural products should be inspected and authenticated by a special agency,
they should be properly managed, and they should be kept from becoming crude and
randomly produced hack work. Even while local ethnic groups everywhere are
encouraged to open up cultural tourism, they must be careful to protect the original
form and unaltered qualities of their ethnic traditional culture. They must not go the
way of vulgarization and over-commercialization, which would be to lose the cultural
characteristics most attractive to visitors. Only in this way will all of the people's rich
cultural resources have a flourishing rather than declining power of attraction, and
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prove useful to the advancement of the local economy and the improvement of the
people's lives.
57.23 One important link to preserving sustainable tourism resources and attracting
tourists is to coordinate and harmonize tourist facilities within specific natural and
cultural environments—this is also the primary principle of eco-tourism. Therefore
when selecting sites and designs for building hotels, restaurants, and attractions in
tourist districts we must be extremely cautious. Both the outward appearance and
interior should match the local ethnic flavor as much as possible so that it blends in
with the natural and human environment. We should not clutter the landscape with
stereotypical contemporary architectural forms or tourist attractions that are
incompatible with the nature of local cultures. That sort of tourist facility, trending
toward other western or domestic models, will, on the contrary, reduce the power to
attract tourists. In this light, many knowledgeable scholars from around the world
have strongly disapproved of building modernized hotels and tourist attractions in the
hinterlands of the Yulong Mountain Scenic District near Lijiang; they believe that this
sort of construction can only worsen pollution in the scenic area and that is not in
harmony with the natural scenery of the Yulong Mountains. The author has also heard
many foreign scholars and travelers say that if they wanted to play golf, there was no
need to come running half-way around the world to Yunnan.
57.32 Foreign friends have been honest about the highly unsuitable appearance that
has been produced in China's ancient cities of great historical and cultural value
—
Xi'an, Luoyang, Chengdu, and so on—by building endless rows of modern buildings.
They've painfully pointed out: "When speaking of a famous city with a long history
and cultural identity, ancient does not merely signify an established geographic
position together with a bunch of historical facts. What is more important is that it
still preserves an ancient style, an ancient tradition, and its ancient treasures."
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57.35 Yunnan has a good number of nationally recognized histonc cities that
important tounst destinations. When we take up the problem of how to build up these
famous cities, it is worth considering the points mentioned above. As everyone knows,
Kunming today is caught in a wave of tearing down the old to make way for the new,
but isn't this a greater and greater loss of the city's ancient cultural character?
57.38 Proven successes here and abroad have made use of every traditional ethnic
architectural style to build folk custom villages or to build hotels, restaurants and
tourist parks. The arresting features of these structures, and the appeal of being in a
strange place, have attracted crowds of tourists. The author, while conducting
research in Canada, visited guest houses in the style of traditional Native American
igloos!2 and log cabins. 13 They were beautiful to look at, quite cozy, and perfectly
suited to the peoples' spirit. Every year many travelers come to these for a taste of the
Native American ambiance. In Yunnan, the traditional architecture of the old town in
Lijiang, and the Dai architecture of Jinghong's Manjinglan Village in Xishuangbanna,
are both successful examples of attracting tourists. To build tasteful hotels or small
restaurants in this sort of architectural style is not so difficult to do, as in the small
restaurants built in the traditional courtyards of Dali's old town, which have become
traveler's favorites.
58.4 In developing the Sino-Canadian "work-unity" joint venture project, (under the
leadership of the Yunnan Academy of Social Science and Canada's Simon Frazier
University,) the groundwork for an "International Cooperative Lijiang Development
Research Center" was recently established. In addition, it was suggested that the
center itself should be set up in a traditional Naxi-style "Three shops and one facing
wall" 14 setting. Many of the foreign tourists who arrive in Lijiang have expressed
interest in staying in Naxi housing, and this too offers an insightful guide for
developing Yunnan's tourist industry.
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58.8 The fate of Yunnan's tourism industry rests on the strong resources of its
unique, enchanting natural and human environment. Therefore, to develop Yunnan's
tourism industry, we must seize on the preservation and improvement of these
resources, and we must expand eco-tourism to the point where the local people and
tourists all share a public consciousness to protect the environment. In addition to
formulating and carrying out necessary rules and regulations, promoting a vital
awareness of protecting tourism resources, and strengthening management, we must
work hard to utilize and respect all the ethnic peoples' ecological sense of ethics and
their customary ways of protecting the environment. For example, the worship of
sacred mountains among Tibetans has made it a taboo to chop trees or pollute in
sacred places. Because of this taboo, in the regions surrounding the sacred mountains,
sacred forests, and sacred lakes, the environment has been fairly well preserved.
Historically, the Naxi and Tibetan people have also had the custom of an annual
specified time to "shore up the mountains and prohibit swine," 15 which has been
greatly beneficial to their localities. The taboo against taking life among Tibetans has
also helped to preserve wildlife. And the Naxi, in their Dongba religion, have a sort
of interdependent traditional ecological morality and customs. They see Nature and
humankind as bound together into a single set, as conceptual brothers in their
philosophical system.
58.17 The beneficial factors of ethnic culture can all be amply carried forward and
used to advance the preservation of the environment. In the course of developing the
tourism industry we should also widely publicize these traditional ecological ethics
and customs to travelers so that they might better understand the spirit of the local
people and work together to protect the environment in tourism districts. Once these
factors have been set into motion and publicized, they will attract large numbers of
eco-tourism enthusiasts. We can also seek related foreign organizations to cooperate
on opportunities to further develop eco-tourism and environmental protection.
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NOTES FOR APPENDIX
1. Quanmin dazhan gangtietong £JftIKftR|. The campaign for mass production
oi metal ores, undertaken during the Great Leap Forward.
2. Dayuejin±^jg. The Great Leap Forward, launched in May 1958.
3. Dabanshitang fffi&g. Communilization of dining halls (ca 1958).
4. Weihu zaotian U^ifBB. Mass labor land reclamation (ca 1958-62).
5. Wenge $r^. The Cultural Revolution, shortened from of wenhua dageming £
itjKMnp, the Great Cultural Revoluton (ca 1966-76).
6. Sanfei HH§ the "three pollutions" of earth, water and air.
7. The scenic high elevation lake, Dianchi, which sits at the base of majestic soaring
cliffs, had become the recipient of the Kunming's untreated wastes. Beginning in the
90's a large-scale clean-up project was undertaken, and a US$130 million clean-up
project was proposed to the World Bank. The Xiyuan tunnel, which diverts municipal
wastes away from the lake began construction in 1994 and went into operation in Mar
1996. (Xinhua 13 Mar 96, via LexisNexis).
8. Deqen, the local pronunciation is used, instead of Mandarin reading, Deqin
^Jfc.
Note also that this area was hit by a devastating earthquake on February 3rd, 1996,
which levelled parts of Lijiang, and caused several hundred fatalities. Another quake
hit the region in September 1996.
9. Yiche clothing is illustrated in China Pictorial 5 (1987): 43 and cover.
10. Jitian^^.
11. San duo
12. Dongwu ^JH- Alternate of bing wu, )7KM (see Liang, 1982: 93).
13. Mu lengfang 7fcHJ§- As in a house assembled ofwood interlocked at the "edges
and corners," or a log cabin.
14. San fang yi zhao bi ELBfcMth-
15. Fengshanjinzhutf^-iJjIpg.
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